Password Requirements: Myths and Madness
81–90 of 257 posts
Re: Password Requirements: Myths and Madness
#82Rotating passwords is an old idea but mathematically it does reduce the probability of bring compromised. Otherwise I can know for certain when something is not your password each time I get it wrong.
Please can you show your work.
Most websites limit the attempts per user per time, which should make direct request break-ins unrealistic to mathematically impossible. So now we move the needle to "Your user database has been stolen, someone is trying to break hashed + salted passwords" which is such a problematic scenario for so many other reasons (e.g. unencrypted password recovery information stolen, PII stolen, and social engineering information verification info stolen) that rotating user's passwords weeks-months later is such wishful thinking.
Like, I legitimately don't get it. It was created in the late 1980s by people who just did what sounded right, and we've been stuck with it for over thirty years because change it hard.
Re: Password Requirements: Myths and Madness
#83Earlier quoted context omitted.
I have had trouble convincing people before, would you happen to have a link ?
https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html#memsecret They refer to it as a “Memorized Secret“. The appendix, “Strength of Memorized Secrets” is informative rather than a guideline, but I would recommend quoting it too in such discussions: > composition rules, which require the user to choose passwords constructed using a mix of character types, such as at least one digit, uppercase letter, and symbol. However, an…
Of course there's TouchID and Windows hello but they don't work if your laptop is closed in a dock. Or in my case a Mac mini at home.
This is why I still stick to the truly random sorry password, I have no issues remembering arbitrary strings for some reason :)
Re: Password Requirements: Myths and Madness
#84Imagine the password for my Gmail is Watermelon45. Theory says that's super weak, but I'm not a watermelon farmer and I wasn't born in 1945 so nobody who knows me is ever going to guess it. I trust Google will effectively block against brute force attacks by rate limiting login attempts, and if Google is breached and the password cracked as long as I'm not reusing it somewhere else it doesn't matter.
Now if I encrypt my portable SSD with the same password that is a problem. It would be trivial to brute force. So external storage, computer logins, ssh keys are perhaps examples of the very few situations where high entropy passwords are actually useful. For everything else which is 95% of passwords, easy to remember but unique is fine.
Re: Password Requirements: Myths and Madness
#85My favorite is this transaction: I forgot my password. Can you send me a link? Sure, here you go. Pick a new password. Okay, CorrectHorseBatteryStaple. Sorry, you can't use an old password
Re: Password Requirements: Myths and Madness
#86Earlier quoted context omitted.
From this doc: https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html There’s also this great quote: Verifiers SHOULD NOT impose other composition rules (e.g., requiring mixtures of different character types or prohibiting consecutively repeated characters) for memorized secrets. Verifiers SHOULD NOT require memorized secrets to be changed arbitrarily (e.g., periodically). There’s other great stuff in there as well like that…
Expiring passwords are the bane of my existence. My current job does that. It was originally a requirement by Microsoft and they've been recommending against it, but it catches up slowly.
Re: Password Requirements: Myths and Madness
#87In the b2b world it's basically impossible to improve password policies. Most of the onerous examples only exist because some other entity (a customer, insurance company, parent company, etc) has demanded them. The problem is that the demand isn't being made by security professionals, it's being made by risk management people who are only interested in a simple way to mitigate risk - it's simply much easier for them…
You might be able to appeal to NIST standards, which now recommend against some of the bad practices like special characters.
After pointing to the NIST standards (and two other references) saying that that reduced security and saying "we're not prepared to reduce our security" they backed off.
Re: Password Requirements: Myths and Madness
#88Earlier quoted context omitted.
From this doc: https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html There’s also this great quote: Verifiers SHOULD NOT impose other composition rules (e.g., requiring mixtures of different character types or prohibiting consecutively repeated characters) for memorized secrets. Verifiers SHOULD NOT require memorized secrets to be changed arbitrarily (e.g., periodically). There’s other great stuff in there as well like that…
Expiring passwords are the bane of my existence. My current job does that. It was originally a requirement by Microsoft and they've been recommending against it, but it catches up slowly.
Re: Password Requirements: Myths and Madness
#89Earlier quoted context omitted.
> - Past password similarity checking (I'm actually not even sure how they do this unless they somehow have access to the plaintext version of user passwords; if there's a benign/secure way of doing this I'd be very curious) Same way you verify the current password: hash it and compare to what you have on file. If you use salted hashes and the salt changes, you'll have to keep enough of those around, too.
I think you missed the word “similarity”. You can’t check similarity with hashes, only exact matches
Re: Password Requirements: Myths and Madness
#90In the b2b world it's basically impossible to improve password policies. Most of the onerous examples only exist because some other entity (a customer, insurance company, parent company, etc) has demanded them. The problem is that the demand isn't being made by security professionals, it's being made by risk management people who are only interested in a simple way to mitigate risk - it's simply much easier for them…
You might be able to appeal to NIST standards, which now recommend against some of the bad practices like special characters.