This is a really cool project! One thought that I have: would there be an issue sending this file in an unsecure context where MITM is a possibility? Alice sends Bob her HTML file over an unsecured medium, and Jane intercepts this traffic, and gives Bob a modified HTML file that will report the password back to Jane. Jane can set it up so that the browser still displays the local file as it's source, but has an HTTP…
Yes. This is essentially a binary with the browser acting as the OS. And if it's hosted on a server it's a binary which may change at any moment. There isn't even a mechanism by which to freeze its hash and alert you if it changes - a browser would have to provide that functionality. To be fair, the exact same problem afflicts something like Protonmail, so calling it a toy may be too harsh.
Show HN: Portable Secret – How I store my secrets and communicate privately
311–320 of 385 posts
Re: Show HN: Portable Secret – How I store my secrets and communicate privately
#312Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'd be happy to see the wallet emptied. This is what the bounty is for. I just hope whoever cracks it lets me know how they did it and how hard it was. This is what a bounty is, no?
$400 is nothing, put your life savings into this system if you trust it so much. It's a cute marketing gimmick, that's about it.
Re: Show HN: Portable Secret – How I store my secrets and communicate privately
#313I can confirm that the password for the bitcoin wallet is not banana.
Re: Show HN: Portable Secret – How I store my secrets and communicate privately
#314Re: Show HN: Portable Secret – How I store my secrets and communicate privately
#315This is a really cool project! One thought that I have: would there be an issue sending this file in an unsecure context where MITM is a possibility? Alice sends Bob her HTML file over an unsecured medium, and Jane intercepts this traffic, and gives Bob a modified HTML file that will report the password back to Jane. Jane can set it up so that the browser still displays the local file as it's source, but has an HTTP…
I’d expect better from Jane. This is the kind of shit Mallory would pull.
Re: Show HN: Portable Secret – How I store my secrets and communicate privately
#316This has some desirable security properties, but I would like to see more analysis on the security side (not just: is secure or is not secure). Passwords: - Easy to memorize. Pro: Does not rely on a device, can be recovered if devices stolen. - Easy to phish. Con: Attacker can use a look-a-like page, click-jacking, and pixel extraction (frame stealing) attacks to get password & secret. - Easy to brute force. Con: Rel…
Thank you for the comment and thoughts. Agree with most, disagree with some (easy to brute-force?), but I wanted to comment on this in particular: > Easy to phish. Con: Attacker can use a look-a-like page, click-jacking, and pixel extraction (frame stealing) attacks to get password & secret This to me is the most glaring "vulnerability". i.e. I use this to exchange letters with my friend Bob. Now someone impersonates…
Don’t delude yourself. These phishing pages with mirrored login portals happen to podunk organizations all of the time.
If someone manages to get a link to your page and is interesting in the contents, duping it and sending a phishing link to the suspected password holder is a trivial spear phishing attack (with an annoyingly high success rate).
Re: Show HN: Portable Secret – How I store my secrets and communicate privately
#317Earlier quoted context omitted.
The GP comment about "easy to brute force" must be read in context with the remainder of the comment about "easy to brute force": "Relies on human adherence to password best practices to maintain sufficient entropy. Learning from industry that this does not work in widespread adoption" The GP's statement can be boiled down to: "users will choose poor passwords" (as in Password1!) because it has been shown time and ag…
Right, agree with all of that. I would have characterized as "user can shoot themselves on the foot (i.e. by choosing weak password)", rather than "easy to bruteforce"
Re: Show HN: Portable Secret – How I store my secrets and communicate privately
#318Earlier quoted context omitted.
why would a smart contract help though? there needs to be proof that the encrypted key is valid, this would require zero knowledge proof but I'm not sure how you can do it for this use case.
He could post a secret in the decrypted text on the page that, once submitted to the chain, fulfills the contract and transfers the ETH. I know very little about smart contracts but I thought this is what they’re good at… “if a value is posted with a sha512 hash that matches x, the contract is fulfilled”, and put the value on the page, encrypted, and ask hackers to decrypt it. It doesn’t necessarily prove that the en…
Proving that an encrypted text has the private key is possible for some encryption schemes through zero knowledge proofs, but I guess not in this case in particular.
Re: Show HN: Portable Secret – How I store my secrets and communicate privately
#319Earlier quoted context omitted.
Right, agree with all of that. I would have characterized as "user can shoot themselves on the foot (i.e. by choosing weak password)", rather than "easy to bruteforce"
But users choosing a weak password on a standard rate limited service login is significantly different to choosing a poor password in something that the attacker has unlimited, low latency and undetectable attempts against.
Here the latency the attacker is limited by the amount of parallelism they can bring to bear on e.g. PBKDF. Ultimately this is an economic consideration about the cost to protect a secret vs cost to crack it.
Re: Show HN: Portable Secret – How I store my secrets and communicate privately
#320You don't have to re-enter the key during each save, the plugin keeps the key during the vim session in an encrypted form (encrypted with a temp key).
The vim extension is using openssl for aes encryption (using aes-256-ecb - so if a part of the file gets damaged then you won't loose the whole file)
(oh, vim -x seems to be doing something similar, they use blowfish as the default. I am not hashing the text in order to verify its authenticity, probably should add that to my vim extension)