But it's only solid game theory if one side doesn't have escalatory dominance.
For example, during the cold war, the US always had far, far fewer troops in Europe than the Soviet Union, and didn't have anywhere near the sea-lift capacity to transport the quantities of men and material necessary across the Atlantic to defend Europe. But we had nukes, and so we had plans to nuke Germany in case Warsaw pact forces invaded and made sure the Soviets understood those plans. Nuclear weapons nullified the escalatory dominance of the Soviet Union in a land war against NATO.
Now, the question is, who has escalatory dominance in Taiwan? It's clearly China. All the US can do is blow up the chip fabs, but China wants Taiwan for reasons that have nothing to do with the chip fabs, and would still want Taiwan even if it had no chip fabs. Even if it had no industry or population whatsoever. Whereas the US only wants Taiwan for the fabs, which China can destroy whenever it wants.
Unless we actually put nukes in Taiwan or commit to defending Taiwan with nukes, China will have escalatory dominance and not the U.S.
So that leads us to the second question -- what happens when you threaten to escalate but the other side has escalatory dominance? Then you end up making the situation worse, because you are in effect provoking the other side to begin a chain of events in which you are guaranteed to lose. That is not solid game theory.