I am glad it looks like the IETF ACME specification only addresses the HTTP-01 challenge. I really would like to see improvements made to the DNS-01 challenge before it's ratified, namely, let us publish a public key to a TXT record and use the private key to sign the renewal request. Then I can revoke certbot's access to my DNS records and stop hacking the `.well-known` path.
A Year-End Letter from our Executive Director
71–80 of 155 posts
Re: A Year-End Letter from our Executive Director
#72Earlier quoted context omitted.
Indeed! It's how security should work, and should be the default dual-goal of any piece of security software: provide as much security as possible to as many people as possible.
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Also you're mixing security on data transportation with security of data at rest. Both are important but there are different solutions to each.
Re: A Year-End Letter from our Executive Director
#73Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nobody offers more than a year now. It’s annoying. So many old devices still need to be supported and can’t automatically update.
If these devices have internet access they can auto renew. If they don't, they don't need a cert signed by a public CA.
If I have a smart device at home I may put it on a network that has no outgoing access to the internet, but it would still be nice to be able to connect to it with a web browser without getting angry expired certificate warnings.
It's not the worst problem to have, and I don't think it's easy to fix, but it's still annoying.
Re: A Year-End Letter from our Executive Director
#74Earlier quoted context omitted.
Indeed! It's how security should work, and should be the default dual-goal of any piece of security software: provide as much security as possible to as many people as possible.
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Why does Bill Gates use Windows? There must be some fatal flaw in macOS if so many are choosing other operating systems!
Re: A Year-End Letter from our Executive Director
#75In all the excitement (I too think that they did massive strides in usability of https to the masses), nobody mentions of systems-level consequences of a single entity holding the keys to 300000000 servers on the internet. They’re now in a “don’t be evil” phase. But the people move on, change, etc. And the companies get sold, rogue, bankrupt… I realize an org itself won’t fancy ponder its inevitable deviation from to…
Re: A Year-End Letter from our Executive Director
#76I don't understand why Let's Encrypt is OK but DANE isn't. They both use DNS to authenticate certificates, why not cut out the middleman?
DANE relies on the DNS being end-to-end secure, which all boils down to the root being secure. It's extremely centralized in a way that is just diammetrally opposed to how the Internet is designed.
Re: A Year-End Letter from our Executive Director
#77Earlier quoted context omitted.
Indeed! It's how security should work, and should be the default dual-goal of any piece of security software: provide as much security as possible to as many people as possible.
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Two, you're likely misunderstanding the purpose of SSL and Let's Encrypt. It's not to protect you against the site you're talking to, it's to prevent man in the middle attacks on the way. It ensures you can't walk into a starbucks for an hour and walk away with dozens of facebook logins.
Lastly, the big players don't use Let's Encrypt for reliability and customer service purposes. If you run a blog and your cert screws up, the 3 people visitng your site that week will have to click a few extra buttons to get in.
If you're a microsoft, that can mean thousands if not millions of users hitting this wall they expect not to have, leading to huge costs for customer support and occassionally deeper issues updating certificates. Exactly the same reason Bank of America doesn't use godaddy.com for their domain name.
Before Let's Encrypt, certs cost money from certificate authorities, so not many smaller companies would bother. Now it's streamlined enough that browsers throw scary warnings if you don't have it, which is a massive improvement for everyone using the web.
Re: A Year-End Letter from our Executive Director
#78Earlier quoted context omitted.
They seem a whole lot less bloated than Wikipedia as well. Given that something around 3% of donations to Wikipedia actually go to the website, they'll be fine with less donations despite what their nag popups suggest.
I stopped donating to Wikipedia after the size of their cash reserves were revealed. I get that's designed to protect themselves for the long term and it sounds like they've made it so they don't need my money for now, at least not at the expense of other projects that don't have such cash reserves like Let's Encrypt.
After I read your comment, I thought they had 10x annual expenses or something but really they have 18 months of runway. That's not that long IMO.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2015/12...
Re: A Year-End Letter from our Executive Director
#79Earlier quoted context omitted.
Indeed! It's how security should work, and should be the default dual-goal of any piece of security software: provide as much security as possible to as many people as possible.
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What do you mean by this?
Re: A Year-End Letter from our Executive Director
#80Earlier quoted context omitted.
Ok I get not wanting to pick on the guy, but is that really reasonable? Engineering is about solving problems by designing/implementing systems. The more you know about the system(s) you're working with, the better the solutions you can build. Even if you're "just" working at a high level and maximally specialized to a single niche, not knowing how the underlying parts work will really limit you. Pick the brain of an…
Right obviously very few people will be deep experts on the nitty gritty details of any particular thing, but it's weird to work with computers and not have a broad high-level understanding of something as crucial as TLS and PKI.