Earlier quoted context omitted.
It certainly is a social construct, because what tools are at my disposal to convince someone who disagrees otherwise? In that sense everything is a social construct. Apart from that, with the help of computers, it can be made absolutely precise and clear which statements follow from which axioms, and in that sense it is not a social construct at all. It also is much less cumbersome than it used to be, and will conti…
> Apart from that, with the help of computers, it can be made absolutely precise and clear which statements follow from which axioms, and in that sense it is not a social construct at all. I think you are mistaken. The idea that math proofs are a social construct relates to, in my view, much deeper ideas than you seem to think [1]. It is not just that convincing other mathematicians that a proof is correct is a socia…
I think you are mistaken.
I used to be very troubled by the notion that no single set of axioms really can be agreed on to do mathematics, but I have been convinced finally that the truth of the matter is a very subtle point; that the truth of mathematics is absolute; it merely is not finitely-axiomatisable.
With a sufficiently weak proof system, clearly we can conceive of a system where the irrationality of the square root of 2 is not provably true, but no consistent proof system can prove that the square root of 2 is rational. Certain mathematical constructs, indeed most(*) of known mathematics, that which is constructible by constructivist methods, are irrefutably there in any consistent mathematical universe, and in that sense, true.
Yet, no single axiom system can encompass all mathematical truth, as is well known from Goedel's theorems, but neither does that mean that the set of axioms to be worked with can be arbitrarily chosen. The chosen set of axioms must be consistent. The question, then, is whether consistency of axioms can possibly be an objective fact; and even though for any sufficiently strong set of axioms, its consistency cannot be proven in of itself, it consistency can in fact be objectively established - objectively established, but not finitely established.
My evidence for this perspective is Scott Aaronson's construction of a Turing-Machine encoding of the ZFC axioms. What the construction of this encoding implies, is that the revelation of the uncomputable busy-beaver (BB) function for value 8000, which is a finite, well defined, and an objectively irrefutable, albeit unthinkably massive, number, constitutes a proof of the consistency of ZFC axioms. A similar procedure I believe can be applied to any set of axioms that one wishes to work with.
The part where the magic occurs, I believe, is in the uncomputable nature of the BB function, by which it is possible to finally and objectively establish consistency of sets of axioms. Uncomputability amounts to the acknowledgement that though something may always be well-defined, there is no finite method to encompass its values; that is the nature I now take of mathematics as well.