Stop using low DNS TTLs (2019)
blog.apnic.net
Stop using low DNS TTLs (2019)
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Re: Stop using low DNS TTLs (2019)
#2Re: Stop using low DNS TTLs (2019)
#3Another example of the Internet routing around damage. The DNS caching design dates back to the 1980s when it made perfect sense. It no longer does.
Re: Stop using low DNS TTLs (2019)
#4Re: Stop using low DNS TTLs (2019)
#5> DNS caching has become next to useless. Another example of the Internet routing around damage. The DNS caching design dates back to the 1980s when it made perfect sense. It no longer does.
Re: Stop using low DNS TTLs (2019)
#6Re: Stop using low DNS TTLs (2019)
#7Re: Stop using low DNS TTLs (2019)
#8I've seen this happen on internal networks where IT support tries to guide end users through flushing their local DNS cache so the users can get back to work before TTL expires on a broken entry.
The model I've been trying recently is to make DNS changes in three parts. First: change existing DNS entry TTL from 1hr to 1s. Wait 1hr as the caches clear. Update entry to the new address, keeping 1s TTL. Wait, test, and monitor for a while. Finally, increase the TTL back to 1hr. It takes more planning, but I avoid a 1hr partial outage if I mess up the address.
Most sites I've worked with change DNS <1 time per year, so outside infrequent, planned maintenance a long cache time is best for performance.
Re: Stop using low DNS TTLs (2019)
#9raw.githubusercontent.com has 1 hour TTL. github.map.fastly.net is 5 minutes TTL. detectportal.firefox.com is 60/120 seconds TTL.
Another thing missing from the post is exactly _how_ bad is it -- because latency matters. If there is a choice of 30mS extra latency on initial site visit vs a chance of 1 hour of downtime in case of hardware failure, it is not clear what the best choice is. Especially things like detectportal.firefox.com which are asynchronous and normally do not introduce extra user-visible latency at all.