Earlier quoted context omitted.
>That's still a non-zero probability Just as there is a nonzero chance of someone recovering your data by reading /dev/urandom. Technically your data could be outputed but the person reading /dev/urandom would not be able to tell if it was just random data or if it was what was wiped. Even if your tolerance for data exfiltration is 0 you can be okay with a non 0 chance for someone to randomly generate the data. >If w…
> Just as there is a nonzero chance of someone recovering your data by reading /dev/urandom. That variety of non-zero is much closer to zero than the risk of increasingly-sophisticated equipment being able to recover overwritten data - and unlike the non-zero risk of such an "infinite typewriters" sort of attack, mitigating the non-zero risk of recovering overwritten information from media is straightforward: destroy…
No, it isn't. Reread the paper I referenced. The chance of recover exponentially decays which means the probability does quickly go to zero as the number of bits you want to recover increases.
>trusting an opaque blob of SSD firmware to overwrite all of the data for you.
No, you are trusting them to overwrite the encryption key and that the encryption being used is secure.