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Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability

globalsign.com

71–80 of 217 posts

Re: Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability

#71

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is still a significant upgrade in terms of safety over C.

The main argument against Ada is you can achieve a higher level of safety/convenience using C++ frameworks and code analysis tools.

The F-35 JSF project used C++, and had a draconian coding standard, and likely used all of the tools you mentioned. It was plagued with defects that costed the taxpayer billions of dollars.

https://www.stroustrup.com/JSF-AV-rules.pdf

Re: Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability

#72

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You first. What browser and OS are you posting from?

>You first. What browser and OS are you posting from? The ones that use Rust - Firefox and Windows

Firefox uses NSS for TLS, no?

Re: Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability

#73
post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yep we've been using rustls for most of a year no issues. Memory safety go brrr :) Would encourage others to take a look at it. Ring is a good base that's been audited and the lower attack surface from no old openssl bloat code makes a difference.

Ring, unfortunately, has quite toxic project leadership with a history of making hostile decisions towards their contributors and userbase ( see https://github.com/briansmith/ring/issues/774 for one example ). Something to be aware of if you're considering building with it.

It looks like author of ring library tries to protect their user base from security vulnerabilities, but hit by bug(?) in cargo, which changed from warning to error for yanked libraries. Anyway, no promises until API version 1.0.

Re: Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability

#74
post #67
post #65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Does OpenSSH use OpenSSL? I thought they migrated to LibreSSL.

The Ubuntu 22.04 LTS openssh-server package seems to depend on libss3 which is built from OpenSSL: https://packages.ubuntu.com/jammy/openssh-server -> https://packages.ubuntu.com/jammy/libssl3 -> https://packages.ubuntu.com/source/jammy/openssl Apparently there are some problems with LibreSSL on Linux: https://lwn.net/Articles/841664/ (Also, do we know that LibreSSL is unaffected?)

The globalsign atricle says:

> If you’re using version 1.1.1, this vulnerability doesn’t affect you

AFAIK, LibreSSL forked even before that - when OpenSSL was version 1.0 or 0.9 even. So likely not affected - unless a similar issue appeared there after the fork.

Re: Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability

#75

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The main argument against Ada is you can achieve a higher level of safety/convenience using C++ frameworks and code analysis tools.

The F-35 JSF project used C++, and had a draconian coding standard, and likely used all of the tools you mentioned. It was plagued with defects that costed the taxpayer billions of dollars. https://www.stroustrup.com/JSF-AV-rules.pdf

[deleted]

Re: Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability

#76
post #9

> And by widely leveraged, I mean almost completely ubiquitous, if you’re using HTTPS, chances are you’re using OpenSSL. Almost everyone is. This is probably a bit of an exaggeration. There are quite a few other SSL implementations that actually are also "widely leveraged"[1]. In particular, LibreSSL was forked and cleaned up after Heartbleed. Google uses BoringSSL. GnuTLS is widely used and unrelated to OpenSSL. [1]…

Is GnuTLS widely used? People bring it up, but I've never actually seen it in a codebase (and I deal with a lot of x509 + PKCS code). I've seen more wolfSSL and mbedTLS than GnuTLS.

One lesser known common user of GnuTLS is GNOME. Pretty much the entire GNOME ecosystem uses it.

Re: Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability

#77
post #4

How many times does this have to happen before we start rejecting components written in unsafe languages?

I want it to be never. Controversial opinion: as long as those who use "security" to oppress us have the upper hand, code written in "unsafe languages" will always leave a path to freedom from the authoritarian dystopia of corporations and governments who will seek to increase their control over our lives. We've already seen the battle start at DRM, jailbreaking/rooting, etc. IMHO the periodic but not-too-often occur…

Security flaws can be exploited by governments and corporations, too.

Re: Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability

#78
post #4

How many times does this have to happen before we start rejecting components written in unsafe languages?

All languages are unsafe because programming is inherently unsafe.

Otherwise I look forward to the day when we stop driving unsafe cars, whatever that means. Accidents can always happen.

Re: Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability

#79
post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The Ubuntu 22.04 LTS openssh-server package seems to depend on libss3 which is built from OpenSSL: https://packages.ubuntu.com/jammy/openssh-server -> https://packages.ubuntu.com/jammy/libssl3 -> https://packages.ubuntu.com/source/jammy/openssl Apparently there are some problems with LibreSSL on Linux: https://lwn.net/Articles/841664/ (Also, do we know that LibreSSL is unaffected?)

The globalsign atricle says: > If you’re using version 1.1.1, this vulnerability doesn’t affect you AFAIK, LibreSSL forked even before that - when OpenSSL was version 1.0 or 0.9 even. So likely not affected - unless a similar issue appeared there after the fork.

Parallel forks sometimes keep incorporating quite a lot of changes from each other, in the *BSD fork tradition. I'd also guess that LibreSSL is not affected but it's not a foregone conclusion.

In the previous OpenSSH vs OpenSSL 3 bug it went like this:

> The issue has been identified in OpenSSL version 3.0.4, which was released on June 21, 2022, and impacts x64 systems with the AVX-512 instruction set. OpenSSL 1.1.1 as well as OpenSSL forks BoringSSL and LibreSSL are not affected. (https://thehackernews.com/2022/06/openssh-to-release-securit...)

Re: Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability

#80
post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yep we've been using rustls for most of a year no issues. Memory safety go brrr :) Would encourage others to take a look at it. Ring is a good base that's been audited and the lower attack surface from no old openssl bloat code makes a difference.

Ring, unfortunately, has quite toxic project leadership with a history of making hostile decisions towards their contributors and userbase ( see https://github.com/briansmith/ring/issues/774 for one example ). Something to be aware of if you're considering building with it.

That looks reasonable to me. The author is blunt about how he does things and why he does them, while being polite.

Don't know what 'yanking' a crate means specifically, but that seems like an ecosystem problem; in Java for example, maven dependencies are supposed to be immutable and the largest distributor (mvnrepository) doesn't allow updating a package.

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