Earlier quoted context omitted.
Get started then. We can't use something with no track record nor releases published in production systems.
Then rewrite in Ada or whatever. Ada has been around for a while and has been used in important projects.
Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability
11–20 of 217 posts
Re: Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability
#12Earlier quoted context omitted.
Get started then. We can't use something with no track record nor releases published in production systems.
Then rewrite in Ada or whatever. Ada has been around for a while and has been used in important projects.
Re: Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability
#13Earlier quoted context omitted.
Then rewrite in Ada or whatever. Ada has been around for a while and has been used in important projects.
Is Ada memory safe? I don’t think it is.
Re: Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability
#14Re: Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability
#15Earlier quoted context omitted.
Then rewrite in Ada or whatever. Ada has been around for a while and has been used in important projects.
Are there TLS implementations in Ada that have a track record? I don't think that remark was aimed at the language, only pointing out that writing a new TLS library in a safer language is not exactly a trivial expenditure of resources.
Google: openssl "use-after-free" site:cvedetails.com/cve
It's time to accept that C is not the tool for the job. Good programmers still make mistakes and now we have tools to catch most of those mistakes.
In Rust many of those errors become compile-time errors.
Re: Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability
#16How many times does this have to happen before we start rejecting components written in unsafe languages?
You first. What browser and OS are you posting from?
Re: Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability
#17How many times does this have to happen before we start rejecting components written in unsafe languages?
For example Go, while not totally memory safe, has shipped their Go-implemented crypto/tls library for a long time. (And also had some crypto correctness bugs - reminding us that memory safety is "necessary but not sufficient" for a TLS implementation)
Re: Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability
#18Quoted post unavailable.
Re: Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability
#19> And by widely leveraged, I mean almost completely ubiquitous, if you’re using HTTPS, chances are you’re using OpenSSL. Almost everyone is. This is probably a bit of an exaggeration. There are quite a few other SSL implementations that actually are also "widely leveraged"[1]. In particular, LibreSSL was forked and cleaned up after Heartbleed. Google uses BoringSSL. GnuTLS is widely used and unrelated to OpenSSL. [1]…
Re: Patch OpenSSL on November 1 to avoid “critical” security vulnerability
#20How many times does this have to happen before we start rejecting components written in unsafe languages?
You first. What browser and OS are you posting from?
Caddy, Traefik, and Teleport are written in Golang and not using OpenSSL. It’s a start.