Ssss: Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme (2006)
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Ssss: Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme (2006)
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Re: Ssss: Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme (2006)
#2Ha! We used this concept over a decade ago to stop our servers containing credit card information from our customers from being rebooted unexpectedly and unsealing themselves/permitting traffic.
What a fun memory, other tricks we employed was to disable the TTY and any form of remote login; and heavily auditing and restricting the information coming in via a WAF.
It was very frustrating for them to have a fault because in order to reboot the system (which is basically all you can do): you need the CIO and one of the trusted product managers and one of the trusted sysadmins. The issue with that final one was that the trusted sysadmins could not be the same trusted sysadmins who could access the remote logging infrastructure. — also the CIO was a large bus factor, but I was told the CEO also had that key.
If you work on payment systems at Facebook/meta or Oracle Netsuite then likely some of that code still exist there. Maybe someone can confirm.
Re: Ssss: Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme (2006)
#3Written in 2006, and this doesn't give me much confidence:
> Some people reported compilation probems with ssss-0.5. This will be fixed in the upcoming release. If the code isn't processed correctly on your machine, replace line 351 of ssss.c by
> int restore_secret(int n, void *A, mpz_t b[])
Edit: We've come a long way in open source software development....
Re: Ssss: Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme (2006)
#4Backup your BIP-39 Mnemonic phrase using SLIP-39 [0]
This saves the original entropy from which your BIP-39 phrase was generated, over several groups of multiple SLIP-39 mnemonics cards.
Later, recover enough cards from a few groups, recover your BIP-39, and recover your hardware wallet.
Much more reliable, and safer because an attacker must collect many independent mnemonics from groups they probably don’t know the members of.
EDIT: The SLIP-39 standard is probably the most accessible (and only?) usage of SSSS by "normals". As people find out how fragile and risky BIP-39 is, they'll want to secure their existing BIP-39 accounts, and they can do it using SLIP-39, which uses SSSS. You're welcome!
Re: Ssss: Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme (2006)
#5If anyone is interested in understanding Shamir's scheme a bit more, this blog post visualises it well! :)
Re: Ssss: Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme (2006)
#6If anyone is interested in understanding Shamir's scheme a bit more, this blog post visualises it well! :) https://evervault.com/blog/shamir-secret-sharing
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Re: Ssss: Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme (2006)
#7[deleted]
Re: Ssss: Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme (2006)
#8Re: Ssss: Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme (2006)
#9Post dates from 2018, code from 2006. Description of Shamir's secret sharing is still current.
There are implementations of the algorithm in other languages on github[0].
Re: Ssss: Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme (2006)
#10A few months ago I built a CLI frontend for Hashicorps shamir secret sharing implementation in Go. You can find it here: https://github.com/dennis-tra/shamir
It combines the two separate commands in the article into one.