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What is it like to have a brain? Ways of looking at consciousness

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Re: What is it like to have a brain? Ways of looking at consciousness

#101

Post by aeneasmackenzie »

djokkataja wrote: post #60
PaulDavisThe1st wrote: post #32

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The argument you're making is just eliding the "hard problem". We can trivially imagine an electronic circuit that registers different current levels when exposed to red or blue light. Nobody (that I'm aware of) suggests that there is an experience within the electronic circuit, despite the fact that it "senses" different frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum. The circuit is qualia-free. You, on the other hand,…

> you have an experience. What are "you"? And what is an "experience"? You highlight this like it's a magical phrase that cannot be explained, and your arguments suggest that you take it as a foundational assumption. But if you assume a fundamentally inexplicable nature to both personhood and experience, then you cannot possibly recognize any explanation for these, because doing so would require giving up your assump…

3 is incorrect. Additionally, the idea of disproving the existence of a thing by arguing from inconsistencies between words describing it is not related to reality.

Edit: I read it. Anthis readily grants the existence of a mental life but wants to deny that “consciousness” is a meaning property. Sure, for the sake of argument. But that leaves the question of why I have a mental life at all entirely unaddressed.

Re: What is it like to have a brain? Ways of looking at consciousness

#102

Post by mtlmtlmtlmtl »

aeneasmackenzie wrote: post #98
mtlmtlmtlmtl wrote: post #89

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Dennett most certainly tackles the "hard problem", by convincingly arguing the problem is ill-defined and not a real problem. The "hard problem" is not some Riemann Hypothesis of philosophy. Its status as a problem to be solved is highly contentious.

Does he answer the question “why qualia, of any kind, ever?” > Dennett most certainly tackles the "hard problem", by convincingly arguing the problem is ill-defined and not a real problem. No, like everyone else he admits defeat before it and tries to define it away. Whatever the relationship between qualia and physical reality, we experience them (I do. Dennett might not, haha) which requires some explanation. Once…

I'm not a philosopher, but arguments for the hard problem always come off as very circular to me. And when I dig deeper, it essentially boils down to "but it sure feels like there are qualia, so there must be"

Look, it certainly feels that way to me too. But that's not an argument. It's not even evidence. It also feels like it's impossible for me not to exist, and yet the evidence has me entirely convinced that will happen one day.

In any case, as a non-philosopher I can only gather that among philosophers, this is a highly contentious issue in philosophy of mind, and let the sides try to convince me.

When I read Dennett, he uses an immense breadth of knowledge on neural anatomy, computation, evolution, and cognitive psychology.

When I read arguments from the likes of Chalmers and Searle, I find highly contrived, seemingly circular thought experiments that are purposely constructed to purport their argument as fundamentally true. Feels more like theology to me.

Re: What is it like to have a brain? Ways of looking at consciousness

#103

Post by aeneasmackenzie »

nickmain wrote: post #12
uoaei wrote: post #7

Consciousness vs awareness vs sentience are terms that really need some society-scale effort to nail down what we mean by one or another. The conversation circles round and round because many folks talk past each other or interpret discussions in ways that the writer didn't intend. (I'm not saying the answer is available today if only we solve this dialectical issue.) Philosophers of consciousness define "consciousne…

"Metacognition" is a better term for what many refer to as consciousness.

It is not. That I can think about my thinking doesn’t help at all with the question of why I can think.

Re: What is it like to have a brain? Ways of looking at consciousness

#104

Post by PaulDavisThe1st »

mtlmtlmtlmtl wrote: post #102
aeneasmackenzie wrote: post #98

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Does he answer the question “why qualia, of any kind, ever?” > Dennett most certainly tackles the "hard problem", by convincingly arguing the problem is ill-defined and not a real problem. No, like everyone else he admits defeat before it and tries to define it away. Whatever the relationship between qualia and physical reality, we experience them (I do. Dennett might not, haha) which requires some explanation. Once…

I'm not a philosopher, but arguments for the hard problem always come off as very circular to me. And when I dig deeper, it essentially boils down to "but it sure feels like there are qualia, so there must be" Look, it certainly feels that way to me too. But that's not an argument. It's not even evidence. It also feels like it's impossible for me not to exist, and yet the evidence has me entirely convinced that will…

> it essentially boils down to "but it sure feels like there are qualia, so there must be"

no. The argument is that "it feels like something to be me", and then to ask "how can it be possible to feel anything?"

qualia is a term from philosophy that is essentially a synonym for "having an experience" or "it is like something to be X"

nobody says "it feels like there are qualia". the closest would be "i have experience, and we call that qualia"

Re: What is it like to have a brain? Ways of looking at consciousness

#105

Post by PaulDavisThe1st »

mtlmtlmtlmtl wrote: post #89
PaulDavisThe1st wrote: post #15

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Like Dennett's book "Consciousness Explained", the Aeon article falls into the category of explaining what we are conscious of , not how it is possible to be conscious of anything at all. It does not really tackle Chalmers "hard problem of consciousness", despite the subtitle.

Dennett most certainly tackles the "hard problem", by convincingly arguing the problem is ill-defined and not a real problem. The "hard problem" is not some Riemann Hypothesis of philosophy. Its status as a problem to be solved is highly contentious.

I emailed Dennett after Consciousness Explained was published, and put the same point i make at the top of this subthread to him. "I suppose that in some real sense, you are right" was his reply.

Re: What is it like to have a brain? Ways of looking at consciousness

#106

Post by mtlmtlmtlmtl »

PaulDavisThe1st wrote: post #105
mtlmtlmtlmtl wrote: post #89

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Dennett most certainly tackles the "hard problem", by convincingly arguing the problem is ill-defined and not a real problem. The "hard problem" is not some Riemann Hypothesis of philosophy. Its status as a problem to be solved is highly contentious.

I emailed Dennett after Consciousness Explained was published, and put the same point i make at the top of this subthread to him. "I suppose that in some real sense, you are right" was his reply.

If that's literally all he wrote, that sounds more like a polite way of saying "you're wrong, and I have better things to do than argue with you about it."

Re: What is it like to have a brain? Ways of looking at consciousness

#107

Post by mtlmtlmtlmtl »

PaulDavisThe1st wrote: post #104
mtlmtlmtlmtl wrote: post #102

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not a philosopher, but arguments for the hard problem always come off as very circular to me. And when I dig deeper, it essentially boils down to "but it sure feels like there are qualia, so there must be" Look, it certainly feels that way to me too. But that's not an argument. It's not even evidence. It also feels like it's impossible for me not to exist, and yet the evidence has me entirely convinced that will…

> it essentially boils down to "but it sure feels like there are qualia, so there must be" no. The argument is that "it feels like something to be me", and then to ask "how can it be possible to feel anything?" qualia is a term from philosophy that is essentially a synonym for "having an experience" or "it is like something to be X" nobody says "it feels like there are qualia". the closest would be "i have experience…

Yeah yeah, semantics. Snore.

How about an objective argument that isn't dependent on assuming its own conclusions and sneaky, poorly defined and impossible thought experiments?

It's like arguing with a religious person about the existence of god.

Re: What is it like to have a brain? Ways of looking at consciousness

#108

Post by maroonblazer »

prng2021 wrote: post #99

To me, David Chalmer is really overrated as a philosopher and so are his ideas about consciousness. Essentially everything is an example of emergence and this is no different. Yes we absolutely do need to have words like "chair" as a level of abstraction. Yes we do need the word "consciousness" to talk about this quality/ability humans have which is so hard to describe but encompasses self awareness and experience (b…

> There's no magic behind it, just mystery because we don't understand it.

How is this different from, or inconsistent with, Chalmers' ideas about consciousness?

Re: What is it like to have a brain? Ways of looking at consciousness

#109

Post by aeneasmackenzie »

mtlmtlmtlmtl wrote: post #107
PaulDavisThe1st wrote: post #104

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> it essentially boils down to "but it sure feels like there are qualia, so there must be" no. The argument is that "it feels like something to be me", and then to ask "how can it be possible to feel anything?" qualia is a term from philosophy that is essentially a synonym for "having an experience" or "it is like something to be X" nobody says "it feels like there are qualia". the closest would be "i have experience…

Yeah yeah, semantics. Snore. How about an objective argument that isn't dependent on assuming its own conclusions and sneaky, poorly defined and impossible thought experiments? It's like arguing with a religious person about the existence of god.

Where are you getting this? It’s not an argument, doesn’t have any conclusions and doesn’t require any though experiments. It is not semantics. Most attempts to dodge it are semantics though.

Re: What is it like to have a brain? Ways of looking at consciousness

#110

Post by [deleted] »

gjm11 wrote: post #100
PaulDavisThe1st wrote: post #81

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's too much here to really reply to, but I will say this: 1. the existence of GPT3 and its cousins I think comes close to, if not actually proving, then severely tilting the scale in favor of "you do not need consciousness or qualia to participate in relatively human conversation and self-reporting". This means that scenarios where you interrogate a system to see what it thinks are going to rapidly become less a…

The point of my thought experiment isn't "a computer does something relatively human", it's "a computer does the same things a human does at the level of neuron activations, leading to the same things a human does at the level of actual actions". And the point isn't "can you deny that the simulation has qualia?" (though I do find denying that pretty implausible); it's that it feels pretty clear to me that having the…

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