Earlier quoted context omitted.
Like Dennett's book "Consciousness Explained", the Aeon article falls into the category of explaining what we are conscious of , not how it is possible to be conscious of anything at all. It does not really tackle Chalmers "hard problem of consciousness", despite the subtitle.
I would be interested in your response to the following thought experiment: After years of heroic work and ingenious insights, along with a lot of technological progress, we "solve" the "easy" problem of consciousness in the following (I admit implausibly in any foreseeable future) strong sense: (Note: I'm going into quite a lot of detail because I think that when people say things like "understanding how the machine…
1. the existence of GPT3 and its cousins I think comes close to, if not actually proving, then severely tilting the scale in favor of "you do not need consciousness or qualia to participate in relatively human conversation and self-reporting". This means that scenarios where you interrogate a system to see what it thinks are going to rapidly become less and less interesting and less and less convincing as an indication of anything interesting.
2. The problem with qualia is that their subjective nature (coupled with the self-reporting dilemma mentioned in 1. above) means that it is essentially impossible to know whether a given system/individual is experiencing them or not. Do I think that the system you've described could exist without qualia? I do. Do I think it could report qualia without actually having them? I do. Do I think it might actually have qualia? Yes, possibly, but with a lot of caveats.