I've always wondered why NILFS (or similar) isn't used for cases where ransomware is a risk. I'm honestly surprised that it's not mandated to use a append-only / log-structured filesystem for some critical systems (think patient records), where the cost of losing data is so high, rarely mutated, and trading it off for wasting storage isn't that bad (after all, HDD storage is incredibly cheap, and nobody said you had…
BUT
if an attack has the ability to delete an entire file system / encrypt it, they really have the ability to delete the snapshots as well, the only reason they might not is due to "security through obscurity".
now, what I have argued is that an append only file system which works in a SAN like environment (i.e. you have random reads, but only append writes properties that are enforced remotely) could give you that, but to an extent you'd still get a similar behavior by just exporting ZFS shares (or even as block devices) and snapshotting them regularly on the remote end.