Earlier quoted context omitted.
If true, that sounds like a serious indictment of manufacturing power sources with the ability to destroy a good portion of the Earth. That does remind me of the incident where a technician dropped a socket off a wrench and quite nearly detonated a 9 megaton bomb in Arkansas.
This type of thing is common in all industries - so much so that one way that railroad workers would strike is to “work to rule” - follow every single safety regulation to a T causing productivity to plummet. Many safety rules can be summed up as “don’t be a dumbass” but trying to proceduralize that can be difficult. It’s part of the reason nuclear stuff is so expensive - you have to work to rule every single time.
A near-disaster at a nuclear weapons lab takes toll on America’s arsenal (2017)
121–130 of 254 posts
Re: A near-disaster at a nuclear weapons lab takes toll on America’s arsenal (2017)
#122Earlier quoted context omitted.
It appears that LANL is a safer workplace than average "Average workplace" probably isn't the appropriate comparison. Some industries (like construction) probably wouldn't be a good comparison. By contrast, the article states LANL had more incidents than all other 23 DOE combined.
Maybe they're all being counterproductively paranoid.
Re: A near-disaster at a nuclear weapons lab takes toll on America’s arsenal (2017)
#123I would have though the decision tree for placement of concentrated plutonium was firmly established after the demon core incidents, set roughly in stone as the following: Should I bring high purity plutonium samples together? | V Do you want to die a horrible radiated death taught in textbooks for decades? | | V V No. Yes | | V V Then don’t you’re fired. It seems like Los Alamos may be in need of a fresh printout of…
Your flowchart neglects to mention the potential upside: Do you want to experience the results of runaway nuclear chain reaction firsthand? Become a Wikipedia entry? Impress the labmates with your prowess at tickling the dragon's tail?
Re: A near-disaster at a nuclear weapons lab takes toll on America’s arsenal (2017)
#124I would have though the decision tree for placement of concentrated plutonium was firmly established after the demon core incidents, set roughly in stone as the following: Should I bring high purity plutonium samples together? | V Do you want to die a horrible radiated death taught in textbooks for decades? | | V V No. Yes | | V V Then don’t you’re fired. It seems like Los Alamos may be in need of a fresh printout of…
It's much worse than that. Put simply, at this late juncture, it's fucking outrageous that it happened at all!
When Harry Daghlian died from a criticality accident that occurred in August 1945 he wasn't the first to be in such an accident but he was the first fatality—and he should have been the last: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harry_Daghlian
This accident occurred some 66 years later:
• So what the hell were these irresponsible turkeys trying to prove?
• Why weren't they trained to the extent of developing a negative Pavlovian response at even the thought of carrying out such a dangerous and risky operation?
• Where were the well-established procedures that began with Daghlian's death in 1945 and why weren't they in place and operational at the time?
• What the fuck were the nuclear safety officers doing at the time?
• And what the fuck were their bosses doing to let occupational work conditions have or reach the potential where it was even feasible for such an accident to happen let alone the fact that it did?
The fact that this accident occurred should have had heads rolling all the way from the lab across to the top of DOE because it is the responsibility of everybody in that chain of command to ensure that operating procedures are such that an accident of this kind could never happen. (Such work and operational procedures associated with it should be treated and modeled as a critical system and analyzed as such.)
Incidentally, I've worked in the nuclear industry albeit (very fortunately) never at the level of ever having to handle Pu under those conditions, nevertheless I've sufficient knowledge of regulations to know that what happened here was well outside the bounds of all normal procedures and operations.
Simply, it just shouldn't have been possible for this to happen—and even if through some force majeure—Act of God—that it was possible and that it was likely to happen then the fact that 'interlock procedures' didn't automatically drop into place as a default backup protection tells me something has seriously gone wrong with the administration of this Los Alamos lab.
Re: A near-disaster at a nuclear weapons lab takes toll on America’s arsenal (2017)
#125Re: A near-disaster at a nuclear weapons lab takes toll on America’s arsenal (2017)
#126Earlier quoted context omitted.
Your flowchart neglects to mention the potential upside: Do you want to experience the results of runaway nuclear chain reaction firsthand? Become a Wikipedia entry? Impress the labmates with your prowess at tickling the dragon's tail?
also. Test the superhero hypothesis that being exposed to radiation causes you to become xmen
Re: A near-disaster at a nuclear weapons lab takes toll on America’s arsenal (2017)
#127Earlier quoted context omitted.
Maybe they're all being counterproductively paranoid.
I can’t tell if you’re being sarcastic? I don’t think that claim can hold water in an area that 1) has the severity of this particular industry and 2) the org in question was written about because they have documented instances of very bad practices. If it’s not sarcasm, do you think the Pu risks are overblown?
Re: A near-disaster at a nuclear weapons lab takes toll on America’s arsenal (2017)
#128My favorite nuclear disaster! Criticality events. I lived in Los Alamos for a while. I looked into renting a studio space. I became curious about the property across the street from my prospective rental which was surrounded by a chain link fence with green canvas. I researched and learned it was the site of an original Manhattan site waste dump which had, a few years prior, been enclosed with a negative pressure ten…
Re: A near-disaster at a nuclear weapons lab takes toll on America’s arsenal (2017)
#129Earlier quoted context omitted.
I can’t tell if you’re being sarcastic? I don’t think that claim can hold water in an area that 1) has the severity of this particular industry and 2) the org in question was written about because they have documented instances of very bad practices. If it’s not sarcasm, do you think the Pu risks are overblown?
It's not sarcastic. I do think the Pu risks are overblown, and I think the numbers I've posted in this thread back that up sufficiently that I don't see how anyone could disagree. Can you explain further?
The article demonstrates a culture a LALN that doesn’t seem to do so, while the other DOE sites seem to do a better job.
Re: A near-disaster at a nuclear weapons lab takes toll on America’s arsenal (2017)
#130I would have though the decision tree for placement of concentrated plutonium was firmly established after the demon core incidents, set roughly in stone as the following: Should I bring high purity plutonium samples together? | V Do you want to die a horrible radiated death taught in textbooks for decades? | | V V No. Yes | | V V Then don’t you’re fired. It seems like Los Alamos may be in need of a fresh printout of…