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WhatsApp Remote Code Execution in Video Call

nvd.nist.gov

81–90 of 159 posts

Re: WhatsApp Remote Code Execution in Video Call

#81

On this subject, I like to quote Pavel Durov, the founder of Telegram: "Since the creation of WhatsApp, there's hardly been a moment in which it was secure: every few months researchers uncover a new security issue in the app. I wrote about this in detail 2 years ago (read here if you missed it). Nothing has changed since then. It would be hard to believe that the technical team of WhatsApp is so consistently incompe…

I wonder if someone more informed could help me understand Telegram's business model, as I don't think I could rightly describe the startup and product in a way that wouldn't sound like I was casting aspersions. Why would anyone use Telegram over something end to end encrypted, like Signal, Matrix, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, etc.?

Network effects too. Telegram is big in Europe.

Re: WhatsApp Remote Code Execution in Video Call

#82

These applications should be treated as Trojan horses. If they aren’t open source and you are a journalist/dissident or anyone targeted by nation states you have got to assume your WhatsApp/Facebook is being used to compromise your device.

There was an interesting case where a bunch of Android messenger things got a WebRTC based remote code execution[1]. Signal got dinged to the extent that an attacker could trigger it with no action on the user's part. The root problem here is that users want lots of features. Each added feature, particularly super complex ones like video, takes away from security. There is not point in spending a lot of time on your…

> The root problem here is that users want lots of features

Do devs have to implement these features in shitty memory-unsafe languages?

Re: WhatsApp Remote Code Execution in Video Call

#83

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I enables independent, non-involved, non-interested parties to check it. Also when the protocol is open, it enables multiple implementations; keeping a known-by-few trojan style bug in all of them is specially difficult.

That's true. And yet, the linux kernel consistently has bugs like these in it. If you want exploitable vulns in literal media codecs go have fun taking a look at the history of ffmpeg. I love open source. In so many ways it is uniquely responsible for the development of our technology landscape. It is observably not a meaningfully different path to secure code than closed source development.

I think that’s true of all software, people are fallible open source or not. I’d love to see average time to discovery and reporting in closed versus open source though. I’ve always heard it’s better in open source, which intuitively makes sense, and by the nature of closed source I think gathering the data will be challenging but valuable to see a tight comparison.

Re: WhatsApp Remote Code Execution in Video Call

#85
post #52

Earlier quoted context omitted.

When most code is Objective-C it hardly matters anyway.

You only need a bug in a single line of code of your dependency to compromise the whole app. Most of the code doesn’t matter for security.

The usual argument that safer languages are needless, because bugs happen anyway, yet Apple is going Swift, and adopting hardware mitigations to fix these kind of issues.

Re: WhatsApp Remote Code Execution in Video Call

#86
post #52

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Notably on iOS there's no good way to isolate unsafe native libraries from the rest of your app without violating app store policies, because Apple enforces apps to be single process and doesn't allow use of its own sandboxing apis.

When most code is Objective-C it hardly matters anyway.

Plenty of mobile code, especially at large companies like this, rely on a ton of C code. It makes it easier to support features on both Android and iOS. I’m sure there are more benefits I’m not aware of.

Re: WhatsApp Remote Code Execution in Video Call

#88

On this subject, I like to quote Pavel Durov, the founder of Telegram: "Since the creation of WhatsApp, there's hardly been a moment in which it was secure: every few months researchers uncover a new security issue in the app. I wrote about this in detail 2 years ago (read here if you missed it). Nothing has changed since then. It would be hard to believe that the technical team of WhatsApp is so consistently incompe…

I strongly dislike this perspective and find it naive. It is similar to saying Mac is more secure than Windows. WhatsApp is a huge target compared to Telegram.

I guarantee you if we all switched to Telegram nothing would change, and I would bet money these exploits boil down to open source libraries which are commonly used in these apps.

It does not pay to be high browed with security. Even Chrome, with all its investment into security, gets pwned on a regular basis.

Re: WhatsApp Remote Code Execution in Video Call

#89

Since the issue was in both the iOS and Android versions of the app, and it was caused by an integer overflow, does that mean that the bug was in a bundled C++ library implementing webRTC? Is there any information about the source-level cause of the issue?

Notably on iOS there's no good way to isolate unsafe native libraries from the rest of your app without violating app store policies, because Apple enforces apps to be single process and doesn't allow use of its own sandboxing apis.

You can compile your less trusted libraries to webassembly and then run them in a webview?

Re: WhatsApp Remote Code Execution in Video Call

#90

What is the worst case scenario here? Will the adversary be able to break out of the sandbox? i.e. will the adversary be able to access non WhatsApp data?

Since this advisory is cross platform, I expect it just lets you execute code in the application context.

Ie. You can still steal someone's entire conversation history.

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