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A New Life for Certificate Revocation Lists

letsencrypt.org

11–20 of 72 posts

Re: A New Life for Certificate Revocation Lists

#11
post #10
post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I don't see how this is so hard: just let us download the CRLs Previously, you couldn't do this, because not all CAs published CRLs. Beginning October 1, you will be able to just download the CRLs, because Apple and Mozilla are requiring it. It's therefore unclear what your beef is,

> Beginning October 1, you will be able to just download the CRLs Correction: Apple and Mozilla will be able to just download the CRLs. Not me. The link in the post SPECIFICALLY says us common plebes don't get that right.

Where does the post say that?

If you think it's because the URLs will be disclosed in the CCADB, note that the contents of the CCADB are published here: https://www.ccadb.org/resources

Specifically, the CRL URLs can be found in this CSV file: http://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/ccadb/AllCertificateRec...

Re: A New Life for Certificate Revocation Lists

#12
post #11
post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Beginning October 1, you will be able to just download the CRLs Correction: Apple and Mozilla will be able to just download the CRLs. Not me. The link in the post SPECIFICALLY says us common plebes don't get that right.

Where does the post say that? If you think it's because the URLs will be disclosed in the CCADB, note that the contents of the CCADB are published here: https://www.ccadb.org/resources Specifically, the CRL URLs can be found in this CSV file: http://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/ccadb/AllCertificateRec...

I was pretty sure this section meant what I said but maybe you can get them from that database without being a BigCo?:

“Our new CRL URLs will be disclosed only in CCADB, so that the Apple and Mozilla root programs can consume them without exposing them to potentially large download traffic from the rest of the internet at large.”

Re: A New Life for Certificate Revocation Lists

#13
post #11
post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Beginning October 1, you will be able to just download the CRLs Correction: Apple and Mozilla will be able to just download the CRLs. Not me. The link in the post SPECIFICALLY says us common plebes don't get that right.

Where does the post say that? If you think it's because the URLs will be disclosed in the CCADB, note that the contents of the CCADB are published here: https://www.ccadb.org/resources Specifically, the CRL URLs can be found in this CSV file: http://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/ccadb/AllCertificateRec...

"The connection has timed out. An error occurred during a connection to ccadb-public.secure.force.com."

Re: A New Life for Certificate Revocation Lists

#14
> If we had an incident where we needed to revoke every single one of those certificates at the same time, the resulting CRL would be over 8 gigabytes.

I don't know much about this stuff, so apologies if this is a silly question:

If you needed to revoke all the certificates, couldn't you just revoke the handful of intermediary certificates and call it a day? I assume you'd want to revoke them anyways if there's a situation severe enough that merits revoking 200 million certificates.

Re: A New Life for Certificate Revocation Lists

#15
post #14

> If we had an incident where we needed to revoke every single one of those certificates at the same time, the resulting CRL would be over 8 gigabytes. I don't know much about this stuff, so apologies if this is a silly question: If you needed to revoke all the certificates, couldn't you just revoke the handful of intermediary certificates and call it a day? I assume you'd want to revoke them anyways if there's a sit…

It's a good question, if I read you rightly.

There is no "handful" of intermediate certificates -- there are precisely 4 (for Let's Encrypt [0]) and they are essentially on-line root certificates. And if those certificates aren't even compromised, revoking them would only harm the ecosystem.

[0]: https://letsencrypt.org/certificates/

Re: A New Life for Certificate Revocation Lists

#16
post #12
post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Where does the post say that? If you think it's because the URLs will be disclosed in the CCADB, note that the contents of the CCADB are published here: https://www.ccadb.org/resources Specifically, the CRL URLs can be found in this CSV file: http://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/ccadb/AllCertificateRec...

I was pretty sure this section meant what I said but maybe you can get them from that database without being a BigCo?: “Our new CRL URLs will be disclosed only in CCADB, so that the Apple and Mozilla root programs can consume them without exposing them to potentially large download traffic from the rest of the internet at large.”

I assumed what they meant is that the database is publicly available but that browser implementations won't be directly pulling CRLs. Instead the browser providers pull the CRLs and create a compressed version that their browser users download.

In the same way that you can technically query the DNS root servers yourself but you don't tend to do that because your computer will query a more downstream DNS server.

Re: A New Life for Certificate Revocation Lists

#17
post #12
post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Where does the post say that? If you think it's because the URLs will be disclosed in the CCADB, note that the contents of the CCADB are published here: https://www.ccadb.org/resources Specifically, the CRL URLs can be found in this CSV file: http://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/ccadb/AllCertificateRec...

I was pretty sure this section meant what I said but maybe you can get them from that database without being a BigCo?: “Our new CRL URLs will be disclosed only in CCADB, so that the Apple and Mozilla root programs can consume them without exposing them to potentially large download traffic from the rest of the internet at large.”

I have a cron job that pulls that CSV file once a day. I assure you I am not a BigCo.

Re: A New Life for Certificate Revocation Lists

#18
post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I was pretty sure this section meant what I said but maybe you can get them from that database without being a BigCo?: “Our new CRL URLs will be disclosed only in CCADB, so that the Apple and Mozilla root programs can consume them without exposing them to potentially large download traffic from the rest of the internet at large.”

I assumed what they meant is that the database is publicly available but that browser implementations won't be directly pulling CRLs. Instead the browser providers pull the CRLs and create a compressed version that their browser users download. In the same way that you can technically query the DNS root servers yourself but you don't tend to do that because your computer will query a more downstream DNS server.

Yes, that's exactly what it means.

Re: A New Life for Certificate Revocation Lists

#19
post #13
post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Where does the post say that? If you think it's because the URLs will be disclosed in the CCADB, note that the contents of the CCADB are published here: https://www.ccadb.org/resources Specifically, the CRL URLs can be found in this CSV file: http://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/ccadb/AllCertificateRec...

"The connection has timed out. An error occurred during a connection to ccadb-public.secure.force.com."

Works for me, though the time to first byte is currently rather long.

Re: A New Life for Certificate Revocation Lists

#20
post #15
post #14

> If we had an incident where we needed to revoke every single one of those certificates at the same time, the resulting CRL would be over 8 gigabytes. I don't know much about this stuff, so apologies if this is a silly question: If you needed to revoke all the certificates, couldn't you just revoke the handful of intermediary certificates and call it a day? I assume you'd want to revoke them anyways if there's a sit…

It's a good question, if I read you rightly. There is no "handful" of intermediate certificates -- there are precisely 4 (for Let's Encrypt [0]) and they are essentially on-line root certificates. And if those certificates aren't even compromised, revoking them would only harm the ecosystem. [0]: https://letsencrypt.org/certificates/

According to the link you posted, there are intermediate CAs. Those could be revoked and effectively revoke all the end entity certificates.
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