Earlier quoted context omitted.
A simple answer to this is that good explanations are hard to vary. More here: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/jcTsbaQ8hNc7qxwaQ/explanatio...
>A simple answer to this is that good explanations are hard to vary. But the "hard to vary" explanations were built up from observing data of smashing particles. E.g. from your link: - Frank Wilczek describes hard-to-vary-ness as follows "A theory begins to be perfect if any change makes it worse." He explains further using the Standard Model as an example of a hard-to-vary explanation: Too many gluons! But each of t…
I’ll use a David Deutsch example: let’s say a theory that eating 1kg of grass cures the common cold.
You could do an experiment and find it does not. But you could easily vary the theory and say actually it’s 1.1kg and so on.
But you wouldn’t actually need to do the experiment because there is no good, invariable explanation as to _why_ eating the grass cures a cold.
In that case, you wouldn’t need any data or observations at all. You could simply ask why eating exactly 1kg of grass cures the cold. What is the mechanism of action?
In this way you can see that empiricism is not sufficient in any case to give evidence to a theory. We need only a good explanation to judge whether a theory is worth considering to be true. From there, we can do further experiments/observations to rule it out. But never to prove it true.