Earlier quoted context omitted.
"It is inherently different, because it's been proven that you can detect the use of curl|bash Serverside" Malicious people do malicious things? I worry that we conflate trust with validity. Some package systems do it better than others, but in principle you trust that for example, a maintainer of a package repository is not serving you bad checksums and malicious content. After all these systems get their checksums/…
I think I wasn't clear enough so I'll try to rephrase it: A compromise from a malicious curl|bash script is basically impossible to detect. All other avenues at least give you the potential ability to figure out how you were compromised after the fact. With curl|bash there is no trail and you can never find out which commands were actually excecuted, because it's possible to detect the |bash on the server that's prov…
Since we've passed the trust gate up to this point for discussion purposes, I still wonder if there is a better model for young projects. Its not just we have multiple package formats, its the per distro/version matrix that tends to bite small developers and projects on time commitment. I would like to see something better than 'curl | sh' that is practical and portable across the unix-y ecosystem. Perhaps a third-party checksum db that caches valid script hashes ala golang sumdb or similar. Seems ripe for improvement.