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PGPP (Pretty Good Phone Privacy) Beta Launch

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Re: PGPP (Pretty Good Phone Privacy) Beta Launch

#21
I would love to buy your product, but won't yet. I need a few things:

1) You should explicitly test with privacy-respecting Android flavors like GrapheneOS. I assume it would work using the sandboxed play services hack, but I'm not sure.

2) You need another exit aside from London. U.K. has weak data protections, facilitates U.S. spying, doesn't even offer access to the real internet any more (they run a firewall and mandate various other kinds of nannying), and, generally, seems like it's sliding down the path towards some sort of oppressive surveillance state.

3) I need to be able to pay with cryptocurrency, ideally Monero.

Re: PGPP (Pretty Good Phone Privacy) Beta Launch

#22
post #6
post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Does this also randomize the IMEI, or just the IMSI? Seems like if the same IMEI shows up over and over again with a different rotating IMSI then the jig is up.

The IMSI. We don't do anything with the IMEI ourselves (it's in the category of hardware identifiers that I'm mentioning above). Some phones can change them when rooted, some can't. The network attach process doesn't use the IMEI inherently by spec, but some cell cores can query for it (for example, to block stolen phones). It's not a network identifier, and strange things sometimes happen with the IMEI that don't ev…

> The network attach process doesn't use the IMEI inherently by spec, but some cell cores can query for it (for example, to block stolen phones).

How widespread is this practice? Do the major US carriers know my IMEI?

I tend to believe that they do from what I've seen in their web interfaces, and that IMSI rotation alone is basically pointless from a privacy standpoint.

Re: PGPP (Pretty Good Phone Privacy) Beta Launch

#23
post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What payment methods are available, and what data do you collect for billing? Could I pick up an eSIM compatible Android tomorrow for cash at the local pawn shop, and get service using your system without handing over anything identifiable?

Right now we use Stripe (mostly because it's the the most rock solid choice for payments) -- we don't ask for name or email, though of course Stripe could know that as a card processor. But our approach goes back to decoupling human identity from network identity -- what that payment says is that the holder of that card is a subscriber of the service but not, for example, what network ID you got.

Your somewhat evasive answers don't really instill confidence.

The answer is no, you cannot. Payment cards are PII.

Re: PGPP (Pretty Good Phone Privacy) Beta Launch

#24
post #22
post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The IMSI. We don't do anything with the IMEI ourselves (it's in the category of hardware identifiers that I'm mentioning above). Some phones can change them when rooted, some can't. The network attach process doesn't use the IMEI inherently by spec, but some cell cores can query for it (for example, to block stolen phones). It's not a network identifier, and strange things sometimes happen with the IMEI that don't ev…

> The network attach process doesn't use the IMEI inherently by spec, but some cell cores can query for it (for example, to block stolen phones). How widespread is this practice? Do the major US carriers know my IMEI? I tend to believe that they do from what I've seen in their web interfaces, and that IMSI rotation alone is basically pointless from a privacy standpoint.

This is one of the problems with mobile -- there's isn't any one universally correct answer to this (or most questions), so I'll answer to the best of my knowledge. IMSIs are what are associated with your identity (because it's your SIM and service) in a normal mobile plan, and it's what was (is?) used by carriers when they aggregate / analyze / sell location data.

IMEIs can be queried by a network core (not the tower) and US carriers probably do this every once in a while to check against their stolen phone database. It can be changed on some devices but not others. It's not inherently tied to you as a person but of course it is tied to that device.

For those who don't need mobile data service of any sort, I think that PGPP Relay does what's needed -- decouples your IP from your identity -- and you can use WiFi networks without revealing anything.

Re: PGPP (Pretty Good Phone Privacy) Beta Launch

#25
It looks like the U.S. trademark for "PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY" (Registration Number 2015027) has "Cancellation Date April 24, 2020" even though the one for "PGP" (Registration Number 1914615 - with the identical "computer programs for data communications applications, and for the encryption and authentication of electronic information" description) isn't canceled.

Was this relevant to making the "likelihood of confusion" low enough that there's no risk of needing to rename the Pretty Good Phone Privacy product?

Re: PGPP (Pretty Good Phone Privacy) Beta Launch

#26
post #23
post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Right now we use Stripe (mostly because it's the the most rock solid choice for payments) -- we don't ask for name or email, though of course Stripe could know that as a card processor. But our approach goes back to decoupling human identity from network identity -- what that payment says is that the holder of that card is a subscriber of the service but not, for example, what network ID you got.

Your somewhat evasive answers don't really instill confidence. The answer is no, you cannot. Payment cards are PII.

I don't see what was evasive, happy to answer in more detail if there's something you're seeing not answered above. We use Stripe as a credit card processor -- so we have what Stripe's (very well documented) APIs provide. That reveals that you purchased the service, but we don't know anything about the network identity you have nor your Internet usage, because architecturally we don't have that information.

I understand that revealing that information to Stripe may not be acceptable -- not sure what to say to that. We've gotten requests for other forms of payments and we can consider it, but we don't support anything other than credit cards at the moment. (There are credit cards that aren't linked to a person, if that's a better option.)

Re: PGPP (Pretty Good Phone Privacy) Beta Launch

#27
post #24
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The network attach process doesn't use the IMEI inherently by spec, but some cell cores can query for it (for example, to block stolen phones). How widespread is this practice? Do the major US carriers know my IMEI? I tend to believe that they do from what I've seen in their web interfaces, and that IMSI rotation alone is basically pointless from a privacy standpoint.

This is one of the problems with mobile -- there's isn't any one universally correct answer to this (or most questions), so I'll answer to the best of my knowledge. IMSIs are what are associated with your identity (because it's your SIM and service) in a normal mobile plan, and it's what was (is?) used by carriers when they aggregate / analyze / sell location data. IMEIs can be queried by a network core (not the towe…

> IMEIs can be queried by a network core (not the tower) and US carriers probably do this every once in a while to check against their stolen phone database. It can be changed on some devices but not others. It's not inherently tied to you as a person but of course it is tied to that device.

It's also linked to the rotating IMSI, so all of the rotating IMSIs that are used at the times the IMEI is interrogated are linked together from a metadata standpoint.

They're also all linked to every other IMSI that was ever used with that IMEI (at the times the IMEI is interrogated).

> US carriers probably do this every once in a while to check against their stolen phone database

Hourly? Daily? Monthly? Only on first-time seeing a new IMSI?

Re: PGPP (Pretty Good Phone Privacy) Beta Launch

#28

I would love to buy your product, but won't yet. I need a few things: 1) You should explicitly test with privacy-respecting Android flavors like GrapheneOS. I assume it would work using the sandboxed play services hack, but I'm not sure. 2) You need another exit aside from London. U.K. has weak data protections, facilitates U.S. spying, doesn't even offer access to the real internet any more (they run a firewall and…

Thanks -- to your comments / questions:

1) we have tested with GrapheneOS and it does work. Relay works well with GrapheneOS. With some amount of configuration, the mobile plans also work, though it can be a bit tricky to set up.

2) We have many egresses (via Fastly) -- across North America, South America, Europe, and Asia -- and more planned. The London egress is used when you're on mobile data by default, but if you're on WiFi then you can egress elsewhere.

3) Not sure about that at the moment, but we've gotten the request from multiple folks.

Re: PGPP (Pretty Good Phone Privacy) Beta Launch

#29
post #13

Can you give a run-down what's involved in getting service? Would I need to register with you and get an app or something? Which devices are supported? Do I need rooted device?

You can just install the app on a normal device and subscribe to the service on first run. For PGPP Relay, almost any Android device (and maybe even Chromebooks) works fine. For PGPP Mobile plans, you'd need an eSIM capable device (e.g. Pixel 4 or newer or Samsung S22).

Re: PGPP (Pretty Good Phone Privacy) Beta Launch

#30
post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What payment methods are available, and what data do you collect for billing? Could I pick up an eSIM compatible Android tomorrow for cash at the local pawn shop, and get service using your system without handing over anything identifiable?

Right now we use Stripe (mostly because it's the the most rock solid choice for payments) -- we don't ask for name or email, though of course Stripe could know that as a card processor. But our approach goes back to decoupling human identity from network identity -- what that payment says is that the holder of that card is a subscriber of the service but not, for example, what network ID you got.

Once you accept some kind of privacy coin (monero) I'll be delighted to buy a years service upfront.

I imagine many others will be in the same position.

Obviously taking crypto will mean upfront prepayment of accounts (like prepaid mobile credit) instead of monthly billing and will require some reworking.

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