This proposal seems predicated on a fundamental misunderstanding of the security model of non-web applications. A WebView is fully under control of the application presenting it. Even if the built-in APIs were extended to respect X-Frame-Options, applications can simply: - Proxy the network requests on behalf of the webview API, stripping the X-Frame-Options header. - Modify the behavior of the webview (e.g. via priv…
At the same time Apple and Google have lists of hard requirements for applications that can be extended to include these - especially if part of this change over is presenting unified shared objects for apps to use to launch browsers.
(1) App Store policy, including requiring apps to disclose that they can/do capture embedded web browsing activity as part of their privacy disclosures.
(2) Privacy regulation. This is a very intentional dark-pattern used to violate users’ expectation of privacy, and should be addressed.
(3) User education — users should never trust an app-presented web view.