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NSA, NIST, and post-quantum crypto: my second lawsuit against the US government

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Re: NSA, NIST, and post-quantum crypto: my second lawsuit against the US government

#221
post #199

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Filippo Valsorda seems to be happy to ignore the fact that NIST already let an NSA backdoor in, as recently as 2014: https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC_DRBG is he really just going to ignore something from 8 years ago?

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Re: NSA, NIST, and post-quantum crypto: my second lawsuit against the US government

#222
post #199

Earlier quoted context omitted.

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First, last I checked, Filippo does not in fact work at Google. Second: the guidelines on this site forbid you to write comments like this; in fact, this pattern of comments is literally the most frequent source of moderator admonitions on HN. Filippo hardly needs me to defend his reputation, but, as a service to HN and to you in particular, I'd want to raise your awareness of the risk of beclowning yourself by sugge…

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Re: NSA, NIST, and post-quantum crypto: my second lawsuit against the US government

#223
post #161
post #94

side question : I've only recently started to digg a bit deeper into crypto algorithms ( looking into various types of curves etc), and it gave me the uneasing feeling that the whole industry is relying on the expertise of only a handful of guys to actually ensure that crypto schemes used today are really working. Am i wrong ? are there actually thousands and thousands of people with the expertise to actually proove…

Most programmers don't need to prove crypto algorithms. There are many situations where you can just use TLS 1.3 and let it choose the ciphers. If you really need to build a custom protocol or file format, you can still use libsodium's secretbox, crypto_box, and crypto_kx functions which use the right algorithms.

This is completely unrelated to the question being asked by the parent. They aren't asking about the average programmer. They are asking how many people in the world can truly 'prove' (to some reasonable degree) that the cryptography in use and the algorithms that are implementing that cryptography are 'secure' (to some reasonable degree).

Put another way, they are asking how many people in the world could verify that the algorithms used by libsodium, crypto_box, etc. are secure.

Re: NSA, NIST, and post-quantum crypto: my second lawsuit against the US government

#224

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Believing both "Don't roll your own crypto" and "Don't trust the standards" would seem to leave the average developer in something of a quandry, no?

No. I don't think we should rely on formal standards, like FIPS, NIST, and the IETF. Like Bernstein himself, I do think we should rely on peer-reviewed expert cryptography. I use Chapoly, not a stream cipher I concocted myself, or some bizarro cipher cascade posted to HN. This is what I'm talking about when I mentioned the Noise Protocol Framework. If IETF standards happen to end up with good cryptography because the…

> No. I don't think we should rely on formal standards, like FIPS, NIST, and the IETF.

I assume your concerns are with the process of standardization, and not the idea of standards themselves. After all, there are plenty of expert peer-reviews going on in NIST and in the IRTF.

Noise is useful for building your own bespoke kit, but there does need to be an agreement to use it in the same manner if you hope for interoperability. Things like public key crypto are precisely useful because the other side can read the information back out at the end of the process, even if they aren't running e.g. the same email client version.

Re: NSA, NIST, and post-quantum crypto: my second lawsuit against the US government

#225
post #224

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No. I don't think we should rely on formal standards, like FIPS, NIST, and the IETF. Like Bernstein himself, I do think we should rely on peer-reviewed expert cryptography. I use Chapoly, not a stream cipher I concocted myself, or some bizarro cipher cascade posted to HN. This is what I'm talking about when I mentioned the Noise Protocol Framework. If IETF standards happen to end up with good cryptography because the…

> No. I don't think we should rely on formal standards, like FIPS, NIST, and the IETF. I assume your concerns are with the process of standardization, and not the idea of standards themselves. After all, there are plenty of expert peer-reviews going on in NIST and in the IRTF. Noise is useful for building your own bespoke kit, but there does need to be an agreement to use it in the same manner if you hope for interop…

NIST is procedurally the least objectionable of all of these standards bodies. Contests are better than collaborations. But NIST itself is a force for evil, not for the lurid message board reason of a shadowy cabal of lizard people trying to weaken PQC, but because "NIST standardization" keeps a lot of 1990s-era crypto in use and prevents a lot of modern crypto from being deployed in the industry.

Re: NSA, NIST, and post-quantum crypto: my second lawsuit against the US government

#226
post #177

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Dismissing this lawsuit as a conspiracy theory is embarrassing for both of them. They are not dismissing the lawsuit.

One says he’s doing it wrong. The other says he hopes that he wins, of course! Meanwhile they go on to attack Bernstein, mischaracterize his writing, completely dismiss his historical analysis, mock him with memes as a conspiracy theorist, and to top it off they question his internal motivations (which they somehow know) as some kind of a sore loser which is demonstrably false. The plot twist for the last point: he i…

Two things can easily be true: that NIST mishandled a FOIA request, and that there isn't especially good reason to accept on faith Bernstein's concerns about the PQC process, which is unrelated to how they handle FOIA.

Meanwhile: you haven't actually added any light to this subthread: the tweets we're talking about do not dismiss the suit. Cryptographic researchers that aren't stans of Daniel Bernstein (there are a lot of those) are also unhappy about NIST clowning up FOIA.

You are in a deeply weird and broken place if you think you can divide the world into "people who take what Daniel Bernstein says on faith" and "people who trust NIST". I don't know if you're in that place! But some people on this thread clearly are.

Re: NSA, NIST, and post-quantum crypto: my second lawsuit against the US government

#227
post #95

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"Roll your own crypto" typically refers to making your own algorithm or implementation of an algorithm not choosing the algorithm.

Would you really want every random corporation having some random person pick from the list of open source cipher packages? Which last I checked , still included things like 3DES, MD5, etc. You might as well hand a drunk monkey a loaded sub machine gun.

Every random corporation having some random person picking from a list of open source cipher packages isn't the only alternative to strictly requiring the algorithm be NIST approved. It may be the worst possible alternative one could conceive though, and one that would probably take more work to do than something more reasonable anyways.

Re: NSA, NIST, and post-quantum crypto: my second lawsuit against the US government

#228
Perhaps the best way to build trust in a cryptographic algorithm is to have it devised by certifiably neutral general purpose mathematic neural net.

It could even generate an algorithm so complicated it would be close to impossible for a human mind to comprehend the depth of it.

Re: NSA, NIST, and post-quantum crypto: my second lawsuit against the US government

#230
post #228

Perhaps the best way to build trust in a cryptographic algorithm is to have it devised by certifiably neutral general purpose mathematic neural net. It could even generate an algorithm so complicated it would be close to impossible for a human mind to comprehend the depth of it.

"Certifiably neutral"

So, by a process that hasn't been designed yet. Especially when one considers how opaque most neutral nets are to human scrutiny.

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