Earlier quoted context omitted.
> What exactly are you doing there, in kernel code? In kernel code? What you're doing is triggering the guard page over and over if the stack is pushing into new territory. > Do what exactly? Just reject stack allocations that are larger than the cluster of guard pages? And keep book of past allocations? A lot of that needs to happen at runtime, since the compiler doesn't know the size with VLAs. Just hit the guard p…
An attacker would first trigger a large VLA-allocation that puts the stack pointer within a few bytes of the guard page. Then they would just have the kernel put a return address or two on the stack and that would be enough to cause a page fault. The only way to guard against that would be to check that every CALL instruction has enough stack space which is infeasible.
Denial of service by trying to allocate something too big for the stack is obvious. I'm asking about how corruption is supposed to happen on a reasonable platform.