You are incorrect yourself in several ways here.
> The claimed requirement to remove the third party UEFI CA certificate from 2022 Secured Core PCs is entirely unrelated to Pluton (it's required regardless of whether Pluton is enabled or not, and even whether the CPU has Pluton or not)
Pluton is de-facto a Secured Core PC implementation, and Secure Core PCs are also making this change. Thus it effects both Pluton and Secured Core, but the new requirement does not effect non-Pluton and non-Secure-Core systems. Because Secured-Core PCs are currently niche and will no longer exist once Pluton is broadly adopted, Pluton will be the first appearance of this change for the vast majority of users.
If I'm selling a 12th Gen Intel system right now, I can keep the 3rd-party UEFI certificate enabled. If I am selling a 12th Gen Secure Core PC, then this year I must disable that certificate, but my non-Secured-Core PCs can again keep it open. When Pluton arrives, that door must be shut.
You can verify this with Microsoft's Secured Core PC documentation:
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/dev...
> Most of the description of Pluton is actually a description of a TPM. You don't need DICE for remote attestation. TPMs are already a hardware keystore.
To an extent. The original TPM is very finicky as documented by the comments on this post and elsewhere - even changing a RAM stick could invalidate the TPM's assertion. For this reason, the TPM was very unideal for DRM due to it's all-or-nothing approach, which Microsoft Pluton does not make the mistake of repeating, allowing for much more granular security that makes it much more easily applied. The second reason why Pluton is much more dangerous is that the TPM could be easily virtualized or hacked over the bus rendering DRM use-cases quite broken, whereas Pluton supports neither weakness, making its DRM potential (again) much more potent. Finally, using DICE, unlike a TPM, the Pluton is explicitly designed to give a computer a permanent identity that can never be erased, which (again) TPM does not guarantee.
Useful HN comment explaining: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25193346
That's actually the big reason why the Remote Assertion is an important point here. The TPM version of it was almost unusable outside of very niche business applications and BitLocker, while with DICE, the Pluton is far more potent. (After all, if TPM worked fine on it's own, why does DICE even exist?)
I think the last point to further back this view I will also add is these comments from a Microsoft employee on the subject.
https://lobste.rs/s/fdguww/dangers_microsoft_pluton#c_tdlo1r
> System firmware is already being updated via Windows Update. The discussion about Pluton and Windows Update is around Pluton getting firmware updates that way (the existing story around firmware updates for TPMs is largely not good)
Microsoft themselves states in Pluton's announcement that Pluton will hardware-integrate with Windows Update for various system firmware, through their "chip-to-cloud" security initiative. To quote them:
"One of the other major security problems solved by Pluton is keeping the system firmware up to date across the entire PC ecosystem. Today customers receive updates to their security firmware from a variety of different sources than can be difficult to manage, resulting in widespread patching issues. Pluton provides a flexible, updateable platform for running firmware that implements end-to-end security functionality authored, maintained, and updated by Microsoft. Pluton for Windows computers will be integrated with the Windows Update process in the same way that the Azure Sphere Security Service connects to IoT devices."
This is a little frustratingly vague and thus part of the reason why Pluton requires some speculation. Judging by the reference to "different sources that are difficult to manage", it appears you don't update Pluton, Pluton updates you. Pluton has an active role in your system's security, whereas TPM was only passive.