Earlier quoted context omitted.
> The frequency dropped even before TPM was deployed on most machines I interpreted your sentence as two disjoint statements and thought you find UEFI/SB and TPMs all useless. But yes, it indeed started dropping before. TPMs don't deal with that topic unless we're speaking of Trusted Boot, which is a whole separate concept. > [...] hinder you adding alternative means without TPM being activated. But that is a differe…
> Having a built-in module that does the job has a lot of upsides. And downsides, especially for corporate usage you don't want your data protected by device keys if they aren't set by yourself or replicated elsewhere. But it is a security risk to deploy such keys on local machines in the first place in many circumstances. > If there isn't a safe place to store keys, it makes sense to dissuade storing them. Fairly ob…
It's a solved problem in corporate environments.
> But it is a security risk to deploy such keys on local machines in the first place in many circumstances.
That's a massive stretch and no normal corporation agrees with that statement.
> No, I disagree.
Other people's threat models are not something you can disagree with.
> If you assume your system is compromised on that level your device encryption will be bypassed via the same channel.
Well not really, it's not a bypass. Continuous abuse of a compromised machine is significantly noisier than exfiltrating the keys needed and then abusing those. Plus you can't touch anything that would change TPM measurements, or you'll lock yourself out. It's much more cumbersome.