Uber is an example of a company that wants to be a tech company, but (1) really shouldn't (2) kinda lacks the technical leadership to really be one. It feels like the right call, around 2017, was to either: (A) double down and build a platform for every kind of physical multisided marketplace (matching as a service, maps+routing+locations+geofences as a service, physical product ops as a service, etc) Where Amazon we…
Wow, strong disagree. Having interviewed a couple of candidates from this space, even for just rideshare pricing for both demand and supply sides is an incredibly sophisticated statistics and economics problem, where appropriate modeling can have long term revenue impact. Even within this vertical it seems you’d need a lot more than 15 engineers.
I'm not at all saying that there isn't a good amount of "fat to trim" at large companies, but often times the hard work at these big companies is making a difficult problem (or, rather, set of problems), especially at scale, look trivially easy.
An example I think proves this: In Austin, TX, Uber and Lyft stopped operations in the city for about a year in 2016-2017 when voters passed a law requiring fingerprint checks (the state legislature eventually overrode this law, which is a common feature of Austin city-Texas state relations). During that time, Austin was flooded with a host of startup rideshare apps, some funded by some technology high-fliers. Even though I liked to use the RideAustin app because it was a non-profit, paid drivers more and funded a charity I support, there is no denying the apps were a far, far cry from Uber and Lyft's apps. Even after a full year there was really no comparison in the quality of the apps.
Just the ride-sharing part of Uber does about 15 million rides a day, in thousands of cities, each with different regulations and legal frameworks. Uber on-boards about 50,000 new drivers a month. Anyone who thinks this can all be managed with "15 engineers" has not thought through the problem.