Live data from Hacker News

Consciousness is not computation

joe-antognini.github.io

481–490 of 767 posts

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#481
This argument is a pretty egregious example of strawmanning. A sketch of the author's reasoning:

1. Consciousness is observer-independent, so if one person observes consciousness, then everyone must acknowledge it.

2. If there are infinite observers of a given computation, each with a distinct interpretation scheme (e.g. observer i flips every i-th bit), at least one will interpret that computation as conscious.

3. (1) and (2) imply all computations are conscious.

4. This is absurd.

5. Therefore, computation cannot equate to consciousness.

No one would claim that pi (the constant) is conscious because some sub-sequence will parse as Shakespeare, nor would they argue that an excerpt of Proust is conscious because it required intelligence to produce. Let's agree on some sensible preconditions for consciousness (entity recognition and some notion of memory, among others) before we start trying to argue by reductio.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#482
post #446

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It’s hard to ignore the fact that physical dynamics in the brain tightly correspond to qualia. There almost certainly is a connection between the computation going on in the brain and the experience of qualia - the question is more about the direction of causality.

Since we can alter, temporarily suspend or stop qualia with various physical and chemical alterations to the brain, the direction of causality is quite clear.

It becomes less clear when you consider theories like the “user interface” theory of reality by Donald Hoffman. The tl;dr is under that model the chemical and physical alterations we undertake are perceptual models far removed from the nature of underlying reality, and so causality is less obvious with regards to how much those chemicals being administered are determined upstream. “The case against reality” is a book with the longer form of this.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#483
post #205

I find this argument completely unconvincing. The mapping in a case like the iron bar is entirely ephemeral, pertaining only for an instant. For this argument to be valid you’d have to be able to persistently map the iron bar, or waterfall, to all ongoing transformations of states in the running program, using one single consistent mapping. Otherwise all you have is a snapshot of state, not an ongoing process. To ach…

> Talking about computation and consciousness is a sideshow, this is anti-materialism by the back door. Nothing more.

I get the impression that philosophers of mind are slowly coming around to the conclusion that the existence of qualia alone refutes materialism (by which I mean the view that consciousness is produced by physical processes) . This post does assume that qualia exist so if you are taking the former position then you would be correct that it is anti-materialist (though the author does not recognize that position).

While it's clear to me that the existence of qualia (ie. the existence of subjective experience) refutes that consciousness is computational it is not currently entirely clear to me how to make the additional step that it refutes materialism entirely.

Nonetheless if this does hold then the only way to save materialism is to deny that subjective experience exists, which I think is a hard pill for anyone to swallow.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#484
He makes any number of unsupported leaps.

E.g "consciousness is observer independent". It seems likely, but it's not at all clear it needs to be the case. E.g. let's say the universe is a simulation for your benefit which optimises away everything that does not directly impact your experience. Maybe my consciousness is just a side effect of currently having an impact on your experience. I have no way of telling whether I blink out of existence the moment I'm not conjured up in order to write this to generate the page you're now reading. It may sound far fetched, but the point is that there is an infinite number of possible observer-dependent universes. As such just ruling it out by default is a gap in his argument.

With respect to his definition of computers, he's glossing over just how little it takes to end up with something which computes. The simplest possible turing machine is ridiculously simple, requiring only 6 rules T(2,3) [1]. While I agree with his argument that such things arising out of nothing by chance is unlikely, it's not at all clear that it's unlikely enough to rule out an infinite number of such devices running mostly "junk" programs that'll crash.

But we also know that it doesn't need to be entirely random - such computation can provide mechanisms for the propagation of life. While cells themselves are not universal turing machines (they have limited "tape"), any number of living things are conceptually universal turing machines (humans being the obvious example), in that they/we can process "tape" without any inherent limitations on length (though practical limitations, certainly).

He then goes on to use his claim that consciousness must be observer independent to claim that even if we have such a computational process, we can't just pick encoding to make a claim of consciousness. But this stretches the claim of observer independence further, and rather than strengthen it, to me it weakens it. Since we don't know what consciousness is, it's not clear that consciousness could not arise from a subjective observation of a process. It's not even clear that this isn't the very core of consciousness. That hypothesis is as supported (in other words: it's not) as the argument he's making. It may be a very weak possibility, but he's not even considered it and given any justification for ruling it out.

I stopped reading there. This is typical of a whole lot of philosophy that makes a whole lot of embedded assumptions that are glossed over because the writer see them as so obvious that they fail to consider that they are assumptions at all. Most of it descends into sophistry without even realising it.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolfram%27s_2-state_3-symbol_T...

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#485
post #33
post #3

I think people start with the premise that consciousness is a specific “thing”, that it is unique and special to humans (and maybe dogs because we like them but definitely not spiders and flies because we don’t) and then try to work backwards to define it in some ways that keeps it special. I don’t think consciousness is so specific, and I think people aren’t clear about how they think about it as something separate…

> My personal experience is that consciousness, like free will, is a useful illusion It is probably just a difference in semantics but for me, it seems like consciousness is the only thing that is assuredly not an illusion. That I am having a subjective experience is undeniable. The objects of my consciousness all might be (and probably are) something else than they appear to be (as is often the experience with diffe…

Deeper than that: something has to be conscious or there is nothing to debate. If they don't believe the debate is possible then the anti-conciousness arguers would automatically be unable to convince anyone. So even if consciousness doesn't exist we have to debate as though it does.

For better or worse, anything beyond that is extremely deniable. Just because you believe you exist doesn't tell anyone anything. You have made a lot of mistakes in your life & maybe you're wrong about this too. The idea of separation between an external universe and a body is reasonably argued to be an illusion - so maybe the separation of 'you' from a universe wide consciousness is also an illusion/misconception bought on by evolution.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#486
post #18

The idea that you cannot get to consciousness from computation requires accepting on faith alone that consciousness is magic. It’s fundamentally a religious-like bias. It’s not magic, I’m afraid.

(Author here.) This is a false dichotomy. Saying that consciousness is not fundamentally a computational process does not mean that it then has to be magic. We could say the same thing about life. Life is not a computational phenomenon. But it is also not magic. It is, fundamentally, a particular kind of chemical process. Perhaps the same is true of consciousness, or maybe it is some other kind of physical process. I…

I would say that life is an emergent phenomenon, as is consciousness. I suspect that whether conscious systems can be computational is related to the question of weak versus strong emergence. If weak emergence pertains in physical systems then, just as physical systems are therefore entirely tractable to computation, then so is consciousness. If strong emergence pertains, then computational consciousness may not be possible. I subscribe to weak emergence.

BTW thanks for the article, it's a very clear and well reasoned explanation of your position, even though I happen to disagree.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#487
So what? This remembers me slightly fictitious history, how medieval Japanese adopted guns.

First they thought, that it is non-right weapon, mean will not accept by gods, because too spectacular and too simple. But then pragmatism won, got conclusion, that practice is more important than ideology, and Japanese gun masters got huge number of orders.

Returning to our world, I think, right definitions:

1. computer is mechanism, to store and to processing of information, nothing more, nothing less;

2. Consciousness is reaction of mechanism (sorry), to some external information input (yes, it is big and not simple question, what consider just mechanical reaction, like automatic valve in wc tank, but what is more, and some other trick strategies, which are also not Consciousness);

3. really consequence of 2: Consciousness mechanism should have some level of situational awareness of what happen around (by sensors), to know current context, and should have some memory of previous events and some examples of similar contexts.

So in conclusion, computer will become Consciousness, when it will have big enough database on environment and second, database of itself (database's) look on how it related to environment (some obvious reasons, like why it here, what is it's goal), and when input data will processed against these database fast enough.

BTW, Consciousness is not about omniscience, we, people are Consciousness, but we make decisions in environment with information incompleteness. This is especially strong seen at war.

And my answer, yes, looks like Consciousness is product of war - it is don't need when not in concurrent environment with high stakes.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#488
post #472

Pick three rocks and make a line with them. Does the line “exist”? Well, yes, in a way. But also very much no, only the rocks exist (let’s ignore the fact that the three imaginary rocks that you have pictured in your mind while reading the previous phrase also don’t exist). Qualia, and consciousness, exist in the same way that line exists but also doesn’t. The universe will happily give non-conclusive answers like th…

A lot of conversations around the term consciousness mix up a couple of things. First, there is the term consciousness which is a word given to something that humans observe. It encapsulates an idea, and we know[0] that it's a shared experience because the term arose in other languages as well.

The concept of consciousness may be not limited to humans, for example an alien race may have also discovered this concept and given their own symbolic representation of it that they use to communicate between each other, but the frame of this whole debate needs to keep in mind that we are the ones that needed a term for this. So we are the ones that are the best judges of what consciousness is and isn't to the best of our knowledge, leaving spirituality aside.

The encoding of consciousness into states of heat or rocks in the beach is a flawed example because the mapping of encoding is a non-arbitrary decision. Any length can encode any number, for example, the meaning is in the parameters set by the agent, not the other way around. The example falls on its face anyway because it seeks to compress the evaluate the heated iron in a static state. Real consciousness amongst humans has varying states. For example, if one were to evaluate the heated iron and then ask it to evaluate a new situation, it wouldn't. It would simply keep being heated iron.

Real AI wouldn't pass a consciousness test without demonstrating real reasoning about a completely novel situation. For example, I would expect to ask it to evaluate a design for a solution to an as-yet-unsolved problem and have it reliably communicate drawbacks. Current AI does nothing of the sort.

[0] As much as anything can be known, anyway.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#489
post #454

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The point is that a simulation of rain (in a weather simulation) is not rain itself (e.g. you can't smell the rain after a weather simulation simulates some rain, obviously). This is actually similar to the observation that "the map is not the territory". On the other hand, this is a red herring - computation can produce actual rain, with the right input/output systems.

It's a digital representation, theoretically if we simulate all facets of weather and all facets of consciousness, the simulated consciousness could experience all facets of rain We are not digital, to simulate it for our conscious experience we can simulate weather in a closed biodome type of structure where we control the water cycles

This is exactly the point. Simulated rain isn't real rain, it's a digital representation. So, the argument goes, that a simulated consciousness is not a real consciousness, but a digital approximation. It's as real as the fake rain.

In other words, there is something inherently biological about consciousness. Simulating rain doesn't produce water, and simulating a brain doesn't produce consciousness.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#490
post #449

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I know Searle replied to this, but don’t remember what he said, except it seemed a little ridiculous to talk about sentient rooms. I think it’s much more plausible to just claim that the people who wrote the instructions know Chinese.

>it seemed a little ridiculous to talk about sentient rooms That's part of the sleight of hand employed in the argument, of reducing it to one person in a room with a table stacked with symbols in front of them. He's misdirecting our intuition with a trick of scale. If instead I said the "room" was the size of Jupiter, and it had a vast army of people manipulating the symbols, and each input and output took millions…

I'd say the biggest slight of hand is that human's understand other humans "knowing" something as something happening internal to an individuals brain. Holding a biology book in front of you doesn't mean you know everything in the book. What you "know" are the things from the book that you've stored in your brain.

We can modify the thought experiment so that it's something internal to the persons brain. The person doesn't learn Chinese as most people do, but a computer rewires their mind to be the same as someone who did. Think of The Matrix, when Neo says "I know Kung Fu." Would people then say this person speaks Chinese? I imagine just about everyone would say yes.

Post reply on HN