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Consciousness is not computation

joe-antognini.github.io

291–300 of 767 posts

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#291
post #252
post #239

Earlier quoted context omitted.

When I taste an apple that corresponds to some physical pattern in my brain: electrical impulses; neurotransmitters; neural connections being created or destroyed or changing in strength, etc. I see no reason that needs a special word to describe it, nor why that same pattern couldn't be represented abstractly in a formal language or translated to some other computational architecture.

What is corresponding to the physical pattern in your brain? What word would you use to describe that thing that is corresponding to the physical event? It becomes difficult to discuss qualia because we assume their existence so often in everyday life. We talk about our emotions, or the taste of things, or the feeling of pain. All of these things are part of the same group, which is why we find a word to describe the…

> What is corresponding to the physical pattern in your brain? What word would you use to describe that thing that is corresponding to the physical event?

This presupposes something else exists, beyond the pattern itself. I might give the pattern a label, which is in itself a pattern of its own. But that label is just a convenience, something that is useful to categorize the world into more easily managed pieces, and something that is a practical necessity because I don't have the biological ability to observe the pattern directly, to describe it in more detail including how it physically maps onto the world. Because I don't have that mapping (though it could, in principle, be determined in the laboratory with sufficient effort), it's essentially an abstract symbol and I can give it any label I like. But even without knowing the underlying pattern, I know, by inferring from our understanding of biology, that any label has some such pattern, which is its ultimate ground truth.

> All of these things are part of the same group, which is why we find a word to describe them useful.

That seems perfectly reasonable. I'm very much in favor of useful abstractions and categories. What I'm not quite clear on is why such abstractions should be peculiarly unique to humans.

> As a potential other argument, lets say qualia do not exist, and only physical states exist. If I were then to inflict pain, would that be wrong? I would simply be causing certain chemical and electrical pathways in a humans body, which doesn't seem to have any moral quandries.

I think morality is ultimately an arbitrary choice. We might be guided by moral principles or adhere to some ethical system, but even if we chose what principles we adhered to according to other principles, eventually you end up at an arbitrary choice.

So, you can't ask the question of whether it is wrong in an absolute sense. Rather, it is or is not wrong with respect to some moral framework, and you can choose to adhere to a framework in which it is wrong if you like.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#292
post #24

Word salad! What really is the point of Philosophers? Imagine a philosopher getting away with saying "According to Descartes a solar panel will never achieve over 95% efficiency because rocks in the desert" The sentence rightly doesn't make sense but because consciousness is a fuzzy concept people get away with making hard statements that sound truthy while in essence spitting out nonsense that is no different to GPT…

It's not word salad, this is the logical conclusion of the Church-Turing thesis. If you think it's false, you should present some arguments against it.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#293
post #264
post #235

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Bertrand Russell made this point about Descartes’ “cogito ergo sum”, stating it would more correctly be something like “there are thoughts”.

But in this case Russell was completely wrong because he interprets Descartes' cogito as a syllogism whereas it is a performative statement. Descrates' is only establishing that it's self-evident for himself that he exists, and not to assert to anyone external that he or his thoughts exist.

He’s making the point that he-ness and himself-ness is too bold a conclusion to draw from the mere existence of thoughts.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#295
post #235

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Bertrand Russell made this point about Descartes’ “cogito ergo sum”, stating it would more correctly be something like “there are thoughts”.

Which doesn't solve the problem, because it define what a "thought" is. And besides - there are also emotions and physical sensations.

We can just lump all these together as “qualia”. “There are qualia” is the basest possible conclusion that can be drawn, as opposed to “I have qualia, therefore I am”.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#296
post #252
post #239

Earlier quoted context omitted.

When I taste an apple that corresponds to some physical pattern in my brain: electrical impulses; neurotransmitters; neural connections being created or destroyed or changing in strength, etc. I see no reason that needs a special word to describe it, nor why that same pattern couldn't be represented abstractly in a formal language or translated to some other computational architecture.

What is corresponding to the physical pattern in your brain? What word would you use to describe that thing that is corresponding to the physical event? It becomes difficult to discuss qualia because we assume their existence so often in everyday life. We talk about our emotions, or the taste of things, or the feeling of pain. All of these things are part of the same group, which is why we find a word to describe the…

I really think you should try to make that argument without implicating morality.

Science can teach us a lot about how things are, but trying to use it to figure out how things ought to be is not going to work. (See: David Hume's "is-ought problem")

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#297

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It seems to go even deeper. Not even that "I" am having a subjective experience is undeniable, but only that there is a subjective experience at all. When deconstructing sensory and thought phenomena, it can be found that any particular trait that points to "I" is actually ephemeral, and not a permanent fixture of the experiencer. For instance, the sense that there is a face and eyes that is being looked out through…

Sorry but you always forgot that when you sleep your consciousness disappeared. Please take account for this fact. When all sensory shut down, really you feel nothing and of cos think nothing.

No it doesn't.

When you actually pass out, there's a very real sense of discontinuity. You find yourself on the floor, unsure how long you've been there (even if it was just seconds), and how exactly you got to that position (the previous recorded memory being you standing there and feeling woozy).

It's very different from just sleeping, where you still retain a feeling of continuity with both place and time.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#298
post #82
post #3

I think people start with the premise that consciousness is a specific “thing”, that it is unique and special to humans (and maybe dogs because we like them but definitely not spiders and flies because we don’t) and then try to work backwards to define it in some ways that keeps it special. I don’t think consciousness is so specific, and I think people aren’t clear about how they think about it as something separate…

I think I adhere to the duck-typing theory of conciousness. If I walks, talks and acts like concious being, then it doesn’t particularly matter to me how that comes about (e.g. the opposite of the chinese room argument). If someone is following a ‘program’ for responding to Chinese characters, that’s as good as speaking Chinese since there is no distinguishable difference.

"As good as" is not the same as "truly" though.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#299
post #183

Why keep bringing up the Chinese Room. The guy is just a substrate, it's the necessarily intelligent set of rules he's performing (for astronomically large time) that is conscious.

Think of feeling pain? How is pain „a set of rules“? To my mind Searle proved that the mind is not a turing machine.

I just don't see how a limited thought experiment that invokes completely unsubstantiated conclusions (it's like starting from Krebs cycle or something and by the sheer scale of process needed to work up to "sentient mind" you declare the concept absurd) proves or disproves anything about the nature of consciousness.

Re: Consciousness is not computation

#300
The other day, I was training a de-noising diffusion model on a small enough to over-fit dataset, and watching the diffusion process that generates the image, it really seemed some sense of depth perception has emerged from training.

(See the image https://twitter.com/ak92501/status/1475858893561606148 for an idea of what a de-noising diffusion is) In essence a de-noising diffusion is reversing the process of adding noise to an image. You learn to tell apart noise from image. And to generate an image you take some random noise and remove a little noise multiple times until you have the image.)

Watching the diffusion, the intermediate noisy images it generated seemed to stick out of the frame kinda like how a random-dot auto-stereo-gram would. It is hard to tell for sure because the depth effect could also be coming from the light-effects where bright areas tend to stick out, but the depth it produced made sense and seemed coherent with the scene objects.

The thing is, at first order, this effect is not supposed to happen. What the model is learning is trying to remove noise from image, it is not trying to somehow infer some depth about the image, encode it, and passing it to its next iteration so that it can have an easier task. It is not supposed to have some memory like a recurring neural network would.

But somehow it seemed to have learned to perceive and encode 3d features and store them inside its weights, so that when it's applied iteratively it converge toward the fixed point that is the real object. That's what I would called emergence as a compression artifact. For this effect to happen the network must have some sort of internal 3d representation of objects, which can happen if it takes less space to compress the object as a 3d object than storing multiple views of the objects.

Or maybe I'm just projecting my own sense of perception, and this is just a phantom effect.

Maybe consciousness is a phenomenon just like this one.

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