This paper relies on Turbo P-states, where they measure the oscillation when that is active; it is not measuring general SpeedStep (OS software controlled) as some seem to have taken away from it. Turbo state is the HWP (hardware P-state controlled) layer above SpeedStep; turning off Turbo in the BIOS still fully allows OS controlled SpeedStep P-states to function, it just disables the hardware level bursting P-state…
On MacOS Low-Power mode in the Power section of system settings disables turbo-boost. On Linux echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/intel_pstate/no_turbo does the rick. Note that this is not the same as power-saving mode in Gnome settings. I have found that for heavy C++ compilation that lasts for many minutes the slowdown was about 20% on my ThinkPad X1 laptop. The big plus is that it made the laptop almost silent.
Hertzbleed Attack
271–280 of 406 posts
Re: Hertzbleed Attack
#272Re: Hertzbleed Attack
#273Re: Hertzbleed Attack
#274Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yep, and yet everyone in this thread seems to be rushing to kneecap their own performance, for what? My laptop isn't a GKE node. There's a reason this CVE is classified as medium severity
I think the one-dimensional severity classification is part of the problem. If you're running a cloud provider, it's a much bigger deal. Call it "high severity" issue for those use cases. No objection to that, better safe than sorry. Probably 90% of PCs are single-user Windows desktops, though. It's a "nonexistent severity" issue for those use cases... yet we all get to pay.
On the other hand, if you're a cloud provider that multiplexes tons of virtual cores on your physical hardware, I suspect anyone trying to do the sort of careful timing analysis required for these types of attacks would find themselves drowning in noise, as their processes get migrated arbitrarily between cores of hardware shared with tons of others.
Re: Hertzbleed Attack
#275Earlier quoted context omitted.
> they relied on so much detailed information about the environment being attacked A disgruntled, previous employee may easily have access to such information, but nothing else because their credentials had been disabled.
I think you overestimate what kind of information most employees -- even those who build the software that runs on their servers -- have about their execution environments.
Or the time I found a client database was actually a flat file with usernames, emails and passwords in plain text.
Hertzbleed is out of a sci-fi movie. The stuff a lot of developers come across is not exploited sheerly out of professionalism.
Re: Hertzbleed Attack
#276Earlier quoted context omitted.
Being unnecessarily cryptic and sounding like a crackpot while calling everyone else out for being uninformed is generally unlikely to get you support on Hacker News.
Also advised: "Be kind. Don't be snarky. Have curious conversation; don't cross-examine. Please don't fulminate. Please don't sneer, including at the rest of the community."
Re: Hertzbleed Attack
#277> This means that, on modern processors, the same program can run at a different CPU frequency (and therefore take a different wall time) when computing, for example, 2022 + 23823 compared to 2022 + 24436. I'm not a hardware expert, and I was a bit surprised at this. Is that because the transistors heat up more with certain input values, which then results in a lower frequency when the CPU gets hot enough? Something…
Not an expert either but number of cycles is not everything, transistors that transition use up more energy than those who remain in the same state. As such it's possible that 0x00000000 + 1 uses up significantly less energy than 0xffffffff + 1, just because of all the bit flips. That's just a guess though.
Re: Hertzbleed Attack
#278I don't care! There, I said it. I didn't care about Spectre, Meltdown, or any of the other obscure timing side-channels that came after them either, because they relied on so much detailed information about the environment being attacked that you'd almost certainly be able to get the information you wanted by some much easier way. Attacking something that doesn't seem to be in much use either doesn't make me any more…
Re: Hertzbleed Attack
#279Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can say the same thing about all of these attacks. That they are tedious ways of collecting data. The problem is that computers can be made to repeat operations, over and over again. Leaking keys fractional bit by bit or what it is. That's why the attack doesn't work against someone's laundry machine - unless it's connected to the internet, that is.
This is the kind of exploit that might legitimately warrant the character-by-character “password slot machine” animation from movies like “War Games” ( https://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/PasswordSlotMach... )
Re: Hertzbleed Attack
#280Why did they choose to disclose their findings to just two software companies (Cloudflare and Microsoft)? Why not other software companies like Amazon or Google? Or developers behind open source cryptography libraries?