This is kind of a weird discussion. "Embodiment" here seems to mean "having a body," i.e. being able to perform motor tasks in the external world (as opposed to the way it's used in "Embodiment and the Inner Life" [1]). In that case, I don't think embodiment could ever be considered a necessary condition for AGI. But AGI would need to be able to learn motor tasks if given a body (in order to be called "general"). A d…
If we are physical beings, and CPUs can simulate physics, then a CPU can experience everything that we experience, including "qualia". Do you think we're metaphysical beings, or that physics are beyond the capacity of a CPU to simulate?
Embodiment is indispensable for AGI
121–130 of 159 posts
Re: Embodiment is indispensable for AGI
#122The idea that embodiment is necessary for intelligence is just another example of anthropocentrism. It's likely that we will soon have AGI that can solve the protein folding problem, play go at a superhuman level, and create arbitrary images from a text prompt, yet still underperform humans when it comes to proprioception and object manipulation. Humans have evolved specifically for proprioception for billions of yea…
Re: Embodiment is indispensable for AGI
#123Earlier quoted context omitted.
It strikes me as odd to start from the position "we declare this thing to undeniably exist" and then spend generations trying to spit out even one sentence describing what evidence or explanation for its existence might even plausibly look like.
Can't speak for other humans of course, but I'm more certain my sensory experiences exist than anything else, to the point searching for an evidence base for their existence or concluding they didn't exist unless explained would just be weird. I'm also certain my sensory experiences are not identical to attempts to quantify them or describe them in language or interpretive dance (philosophers struggling to define and…
In theory, if we had high-throughput brain-brain interfaces that could be connected between your thalamus and someone else's, then yes, they could experience the same sensations as you. Of course, besides the challenge of having high-throughput hardware embedded in your brain without killing you, there's also the challenge that brains don't have exact correspondences between every neuron for different people, so any such mapping would be quite complex.
But there is an actual example of a pair of conjoined twins who share the same thalamus and can experience the same sensations as one another: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Krista_and_Tatiana_Hogan
> it was confirmed that they share a thalamus which connects their brainstems. Through this shared brain tissue structure and the interconnected neurons, one brain receives signals from the other brain and vice versa. This documentary also reported on experiments that were carried out that confirmed that visual cortex signals based on what one girl saw, were received by both girls' brains. So in effect, one twin could see what the other twin was seeing, making them unique even among craniopagus twins.
Also...
> I'm also certain my sensory experiences are not identical to attempts to quantify them or describe them in language or interpretive dance (philosophers struggling to define and articulate things even at high levels of abstraction is weak evidence in favour of qualia, since the defining aspect of qualia is its the portion of human brain state that can't be communicated).
Language is a very low-fidelity way to express information; we can use abstractions to make up for quite a bit, but it doesn't make sense to think that we're accurately transmitting what's going on in every molecule of our bodies when we say what something feels like to us. And even if we could send an accurate account of all those details, who would have the time to parse through and make sense of it all? And that would be a momentary expression of who we are; it'd be inaccurate in the next moment.
Re: Embodiment is indispensable for AGI
#124An agent which does not have a place or time is not recognisable as being autonomous, or capable of recognising others as such.
Re: Embodiment is indispensable for AGI
#125Earlier quoted context omitted.
If we are physical beings, and CPUs can simulate physics, then a CPU can experience everything that we experience, including "qualia". Do you think we're metaphysical beings, or that physics are beyond the capacity of a CPU to simulate?
This cannot possibly be true, because we have no concept of what qualia are. There is no objective external way to determine if an entity experiences qualia at all. From outside we can only consider behaviour, not subjective experience. Personally I can't be sure that anyone else experiences qualia. It seems like a reasonable assumption, but I'm basing that on a mapping from my own experiences to those of others. If…
Re: Embodiment is indispensable for AGI
#126Earlier quoted context omitted.
If we are physical beings, and CPUs can simulate physics, then a CPU can experience everything that we experience, including "qualia". Do you think we're metaphysical beings, or that physics are beyond the capacity of a CPU to simulate?
Your conclusion doesn’t follow from your premises, and your second premise is false besides as others have pointed out — CPUs CANNOT simulate even classical physics exactly, and certainly not quantum physics. But even if such a complete simulation were possible, there’s every reason to assume a CPU would lack the consciousness to experience anything. When you simulate a hurricane does the CPU get wet?
Re: Embodiment is indispensable for AGI
#127Earlier quoted context omitted.
Well, on the other hand I also roll my eyes pretty hard whenever I see a post that pretends that subjective experience is some esoteric concept. The question is simply "Will robots feel just like you do, or will they merely be pretending?" - it's something any child could understand. Answers could be something like "No, because they lack X", "Yes, but only those that have X" or "Yes, everything does (panpsychism)". D…
Of course children can understand (and be fascinated with) questions like “can a robot feel sadness the same way I do?” or “can my classmate feel sadness the same way I do?” Children can also understand (and be fascinated with) questions like “do dogs go to heaven?” But what is the epistemological status of these questions? That’s what I’m concerned with, not whether children can understand and be fascinated with the…
Unless you're religious, the epistemic status of "do dogs go to heaven?" is obviously "no" (or "we have no way of knowing"). If you think the answer to "can robots experience qualia?" is equally trivial, then just say so, instead of going on some spiel about how actually the question is unclear and nonsensical when it pretty obviously isn't.
Re: Embodiment is indispensable for AGI
#128Earlier quoted context omitted.
Well, on the other hand I also roll my eyes pretty hard whenever I see a post that pretends that subjective experience is some esoteric concept. The question is simply "Will robots feel just like you do, or will they merely be pretending?" - it's something any child could understand. Answers could be something like "No, because they lack X", "Yes, but only those that have X" or "Yes, everything does (panpsychism)". D…
I can't be sure that other people feel in the same way that I do. I assume they do because they act like it and so I go along with it. If I can't be 100% sure that people feel in the same way that I do, then asking that same question for robots is totally pointless.
>If I can't be 100% sure that people feel in the same way that I do, then asking that same question for robots is totally pointless.
I don't see how that at all follows.
Re: Embodiment is indispensable for AGI
#129Earlier quoted context omitted.
If we are physical beings, and CPUs can simulate physics, then a CPU can experience everything that we experience, including "qualia". Do you think we're metaphysical beings, or that physics are beyond the capacity of a CPU to simulate?
Your conclusion doesn’t follow from your premises, and your second premise is false besides as others have pointed out — CPUs CANNOT simulate even classical physics exactly, and certainly not quantum physics. But even if such a complete simulation were possible, there’s every reason to assume a CPU would lack the consciousness to experience anything. When you simulate a hurricane does the CPU get wet?
Both classical and quantum physics can be simulated on a classical computer, to an arbitrary degree of precision. Granted, the case in which infinite precision (if such a thing even exists in reality) is required is not simulatable on a discrete computer, but do any experts actually believe this to be the case? It's certainly not an opinion that I've seen around.
I think discussions about "can we actually get enough computing power to do this in practice" are beside the point - the discussion was about whether computers can feel in principle. If we wanted to do it in practice and were at the point where this was feasible, we'd probably engineer a CPU or co-processor more suited to the task than the general-purpose CPUs of today.
> there’s every reason to assume a CPU would lack the consciousness to experience anything.
If we are physical beings, then "consciousness" and anything else we have must be an emergent property of our physical components. If we can simulate those physical components, then this simulation will exhibit the same properties - consciousness and anything else one can attribute to us.
If our consciousness comes from non-physical properties we have (a "soul" or anything metaphysical), then sure, I'd agree with you.
Re: Embodiment is indispensable for AGI
#130The idea that embodiment is necessary for intelligence is just another example of anthropocentrism. It's likely that we will soon have AGI that can solve the protein folding problem, play go at a superhuman level, and create arbitrary images from a text prompt, yet still underperform humans when it comes to proprioception and object manipulation. Humans have evolved specifically for proprioception for billions of yea…
We won't be able to recognize intelligence if it is not anthropocentric. The Earth could be sentient but we won't be able to tell.