Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's impossible to not be embodied. Controlling CPU and other hardware like motherboard and computer screen is an embodiment. Why would moving physical objects like electrons by micro meters not be good enough, but by meters it would?
It's not micrometers vs meters, or electrons vs macro objects. It's primarily a matter of sensor density. That is, I feel my fingers move in a way that a CPU does not feel an electron move. When I speak, I experience far more than a CPU experiences writing some bits to some output ports. And so on. Does that mean that embodiment is required? No. But your definition of "embodied" misses the point of the discussion.
The baseline assumption in modern neurology is that meaning, for living things, is derived from their physical experience of the world. In short that no paper definition can ever substitute for experiencing first-hand what the "effect" of something is, what it does to you or to the world and what that entails for your body, your life. That is what "knowing" and "meaning" ultimately are.
These experiences are the basis for associations in our constant cognitive (and emotional, instinctive, sensory, symbolic, etc) modelling of the world. Associations beget complexity (dimensionality, modalities) of the model. Hence, "finely tuned" or "high definition" i.e. ever more "advanced" intelligences.
Given the overall crudeness and extreme simplicity of a CPU (or any man-made machine) compared to any living organism, I'm actually willing to bet that should CPU-based AI's "feel" something, it's on the order of 1/100th of what a shrimp feels, and they'd develop real-world intelligence at that level. Infinitely smarter than a potato, yet infinitely dumber than a fish. You don't run ape software on amoeba hardware.