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Apple Passkey

developer.apple.com

21–30 of 421 posts

Re: Apple Passkey

#21

What happens if you lose your device or it breaks or something? Do you lose access to anything tied to it?

I think Apple encrypts the pass keys locally on your device, then stores encrypted copies in iCloud, which you can download and decrypt on a new device.

On the new device you would be prompted for the passcode of the device you lost or broke, to decrypt and access them.

Re: Apple Passkey

#22

Importantly, if you switch platforms you lose all your auth tokens and have to reauth everywhere. It ultimately is yet another way to do vendor lockin, except it has the FIDO alliance's blessing this time. The competition, password managers like 1password and bitwarden, do not have any sort of vendor lockin. You can freely export your passwords from one manager and into another.

As a long-time Safari user who uses keychain heavily in lieu of 1Password or other managers, I probably will migrate to using Passkey because it sounds pretty seamless.

But the lock-in point seems like a founded critique. Does anyone disagree with this claim?

Re: Apple Passkey

#23
Does anyone know if this is different to Webauthn? You can already login with touchid/faceid, with the private key stored in apples keychain. Lots of sites support it, I just added it as 2FA to Mailpace (https://blog.mailpace.com/blog/why-we-use-webauthn-for-2fa/), making it passwordless login instead of 2FA is trivial and fully supported by webauthn.

What’s different about this?

Re: Apple Passkey

#24

For context: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2022/05/how-a...

> available to the masses in the form of a standard adopted by Apple, Google, and Microsoft that allows for cross-platform and cross-service passkeys.

Any way to use this standard if you're not Apple/Google/Microsoft? I'd prefer an option that Apple/Google/Microsoft can call a service (that I control and authorize). I want to be able to self host such a service or have an open marketplace that can compete to serve this service.

Re: Apple Passkey

#25

What happens if you lose your device or it breaks or something? Do you lose access to anything tied to it?

It's tied to a key stored in your iCloud. So basically as long as you have a device tied to your iCloud you can get in. Presumably, if you lose access to iCloud you will have problems.

Re: Apple Passkey

#26

Importantly, if you switch platforms you lose all your auth tokens and have to reauth everywhere. It ultimately is yet another way to do vendor lockin, except it has the FIDO alliance's blessing this time. The competition, password managers like 1password and bitwarden, do not have any sort of vendor lockin. You can freely export your passwords from one manager and into another.

As a long-time Safari user who uses keychain heavily in lieu of 1Password or other managers, I probably will migrate to using Passkey because it sounds pretty seamless. But the lock-in point seems like a founded critique. Does anyone disagree with this claim?

I'm not sure this is any more locked in then the parent post is locked into 1password. Moving auth tools is a pain.

Anyone implementing FIDO should allow you to enrol multiple devices. As long as the auth consumers allow multiple keys, there's no lock-in. You just need to setup your new device before ditching apple.

Re: Apple Passkey

#27

What happens if you lose your device or it breaks or something? Do you lose access to anything tied to it?

I think Apple encrypts the pass keys locally on your device, then stores encrypted copies in iCloud, which you can download and decrypt on a new device. On the new device you would be prompted for the passcode of the device you lost or broke, to decrypt and access them.

iCloud (and anything on iCloud) is explicitly not encrypted, though [1].

[1] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv...

Re: Apple Passkey

#29

Importantly, if you switch platforms you lose all your auth tokens and have to reauth everywhere. It ultimately is yet another way to do vendor lockin, except it has the FIDO alliance's blessing this time. The competition, password managers like 1password and bitwarden, do not have any sort of vendor lockin. You can freely export your passwords from one manager and into another.

If you can extract tokens from a device, then they're basically passwords, not tokens — i.e. anyone who can hack your device can get them. Tokens only add multi-factor security insofar as they have distinct exfiltration requirements from passwords.

Services that properly support MFA should simply support accounts having multiple bound authenticator devices, each with their own private key/seed. In such setups, the proper way to rotate out an authenticator device is to add a new device first, and then remove the old device; and the proper way to protect against a lost device, is to keep an extra bound device in safe cold storage somewhere (e.g. a safe deposit box.)

Basically, look at how the crypto people handle the "hardware wallets" (really, smart cards) they use for multisig transactions. 2-of-3 confirmations, two hot smart cards held independently by company officers, one cold smart card held by e.g. the company's law firm.

Re: Apple Passkey

#30
post #19

What happens if you lose your device or it breaks or something? Do you lose access to anything tied to it?

They said in the event that everything is synced on iCloud so all your devices can use the keys, which makes me think no, it's just a password manager, without the password bit. Maybe they create a separate key for each device, but then why mention iCloud syncing at all.

It's a password manager with cryptographic vendor lockin.

There are definitely some benefits though, such as immunity from phishing. Surely we as the industry can bring them about in a way that doesn't involve cryptographic vendor lockin.

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