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Two envelopes problem

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Re: Two envelopes problem

#311

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I guarantee you that your solution is going to have to incorporate a set somewhere that includes both subgames. You might forget it does, because you simplify to a scalar, but it is going to be there. In perfect information, it isn't there. In imperfect information it is. I'm having a lot of trouble identifying what exactly it is that we disagree about. If you have identified what it is that we disagree on, can you…

Okay. Your opponents strategy in poker is fixed; they will always play the nash equilibrium strategy, they will never play another strategy. Their strategy is fixed. They will never change it from this setting. You've claimed that subgame perfect play can be calculated without respect to the subgame you aren't in, because you can make a choice on the basis of the EV of the subgame you are in without respect to the su…

Ah, looks like I misunderstood the definition of the term "subgame". I thought that this would be one subgame: "I have KK preflop on the button, and my opponent's range is X". And another subgame might be: "I have 75o preflop on the button, and my opponent's range is X". From my opponent's perspective, these 2 situations would occur on the same level of the game tree and my opponent has no way of distinguishing between these (at this stage of the game tree) due to the hidden information, thus I thought they would be called subgames. But you're telling me that the concept of subgame applies in both directions (not only imperfect information by my opponent's perspective, but also imperfect information in my perspective). So when I say "my opponent's presumed range is X", that sentence doesn't describe 1 subgame, that sentence actually describes multiple subgames.

My earlier point was that if an opponent's strategy is fixed, then I don't have to balance how I play that KK compared to how I play that 75o. That I can play each hand "in a vacuum", in a strategy where the EV of each hand is maximized. Note that this idea is only relevant if my opponent is not playing perfect GTO (contrary to your example). For example, my opponent may have a weakness where their preflop fold frequency is the same regardless of how whether I raise 3BB or 2BB. Against this weakness the optimal play would be to raise 3BB with KK and raise 2BB with 75o. Obviously, this would be a bad strategy if my opponent was allowed to adapt their strategy to me, but it's the optimal play if my opponent's strategy is locked.

To clarify further:

- "exploitative style" poker strategy is made at the level "My hand is 96s, and my opponent's range is presumed to be Y"

- "GTO style" poker strategy is made at the level "My range is X, and my opponent's range is presumed to be Y"

If the opponent's strategy is fixed, then our optimal strategy is to play 100% exploitative. If the opponent's strategy is not fixed, then the optimal strategy will be a mix with elements from both exploitative and GTO strategies. (Again, note that this only makes sense if the opponent is not playing perfect GTO. If the opponent is playing perfect GTO, then obviously the optimal strategy is to also play GTO.)

I thought that Noam Brown was making a point related to this concept. It seems that I was mistaken and his point was related to something else entirely.

Re: Two envelopes problem

#312

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Okay. Your opponents strategy in poker is fixed; they will always play the nash equilibrium strategy, they will never play another strategy. Their strategy is fixed. They will never change it from this setting. You've claimed that subgame perfect play can be calculated without respect to the subgame you aren't in, because you can make a choice on the basis of the EV of the subgame you are in without respect to the su…

Ah, looks like I misunderstood the definition of the term "subgame". I thought that this would be one subgame: "I have KK preflop on the button, and my opponent's range is X". And another subgame might be: "I have 75o preflop on the button, and my opponent's range is X". From my opponent's perspective, these 2 situations would occur on the same level of the game tree and my opponent has no way of distinguishing betwe…

> But you're telling me that the concept of subgame applies in both directions (not only imperfect information by my opponent's perspective, but also imperfect information in my perspective). So when I say "my opponent's presumed range is X", that sentence doesn't describe 1 subgame, that sentence actually describes multiple subgames.

Yes; consider a chess move, every move is a subgame - a subtree of that game. He just can't safely say tree, because there are games that are better described as a graph than a tree. Actually, Two Envelope is such a game. The action switch, in Two Envelope, leads to the subgame in which you are at I[null] and need to decide whether to keep or switch - the same situation as you started in. Switch again and you arrive at the subgame I[null]. It contains itself.

> If the opponent's strategy is fixed, then our optimal strategy is to play 100% exploitative. If the opponent's strategy is not fixed, then the optimal strategy will be a mix with elements from both exploitative and GTO strategies. (Again, note that this only makes sense if the opponent is not playing perfect GTO. If the opponent is playing perfect GTO, then obviously the optimal strategy is to also play GTO.)

I agree.

Re: Two envelopes problem

#313
post #94
post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, there is a way to guess better than 50%. But it's a bit weird: You pick an arbitrary threshold, if your envelope is below the threshold, you switch. (You can add randomness as necessary.)

A very general solution, which works regardless of how the numbers in the envelope are picked: Choose a monotonically increasing function f with values between 0 and 1. Choose one of the envelopes at random. Then look at the number x in the envelope. Then, with probability f(x) say that you have the larger envelope.

Yes. My suggestion is a special case of yours.

Both are equally baffling in how / why they work.

Re: Two envelopes problem

#314
post #40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes. The big problem is that you can't have a uniform distribution on the natural numbers. (And by extension, you can't have a uniform distribution on the rounded-to-integer version of a distribution on the real numbers.)

We're not dealing with the natural numbers, right? Otherwise, you obviously want to open the envelope and always switch when you see an odd number. Of course, the lack of a uniform distribution on the reals or rationals presents the same problem.

> We're not dealing with the natural numbers, right?

Well, you can either assume that the envelope's numbers are specified only up to pennies. Or you can just round and say you don't care about sub-pennies.

Or you can go with your suggestion, and look at the lack of a uniform distribution over the reals / rationals.

Re: Two envelopes problem

#315

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You seem to misunderstand the point of that constraint. Correction is not an error or a "step too far," it's just insufficient. You can arrive at the correct conclusion either by pinpointing exactly where the original argument is incorrect, or you can come up with a completely different argument that does not have an error. The puzzle challenges you to pinpoint the error because coming up with the correct solution is…

I think this, because I disagree with most people here about what the actual paradox is. I think the paradox is that the algorithm equates the expected value of the contents of an envelope with the expected value of a policy choice for a player. When I correct what I feel is the root of the paradox, my solution drastically differs in fundamental ways such that the way the problem restricts to pointing out the wrong s…

With all due respect ... this is basic probability theory. It's not really controversial what the solution is. The article's failures are mainly pedagogical.

We can agree that "the entire structure is wrong" because the "entire structure" is giving a wrong formula for the EV and saying "this is the formula for the EV."

Yes, switching and not switching have the same EV and you can always switch.

Re: Two envelopes problem

#316

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think this, because I disagree with most people here about what the actual paradox is. I think the paradox is that the algorithm equates the expected value of the contents of an envelope with the expected value of a policy choice for a player. When I correct what I feel is the root of the paradox, my solution drastically differs in fundamental ways such that the way the problem restricts to pointing out the wrong s…

With all due respect ... this is basic probability theory. It's not really controversial what the solution is. The article's failures are mainly pedagogical. We can agree that "the entire structure is wrong" because the "entire structure" is giving a wrong formula for the EV and saying "this is the formula for the EV." Yes, switching and not switching have the same EV and you can always switch.

Mike, even when you get the correct result using the right rules the expected value of an envelope is not the expected value of a policy. I'm not agreeing with you that the problem is the expected value calculation. I'm telling you the problem is deeper than that. Fix the expected value calculation and you still have a paradox, because you are making a decision not on your expected value but on the expected value of the envelope. These are two different things and a rational person shouldn't eliminate the dependency between their policy and the reward they get.

To try and stress to you how big a problem this is, pretend you were playing the game and you wanted to find the right move that was going to make your EV the highest. Now, if you go with the logic of the problem, you are allowed to select not on the basis of your EV, but on the basis of some other EV. So instead of choosing the envelope, why not choose something else that has no relationship with our EV? Say, the weather in Alaska. If it is sunny, we like sunny. So switch. If it isn't sunny, we don't like that. So keep. It is crazy to do this, because there is no relationship between the EV you are using as a selection criteria and the EV your policy gets. This is the same situation as using the EV of the envelope. It sounds really crazy when you use the Alaska example, because it is so obviously unrelated. It sound so reasonable when you use the envelope example, because it isn't as obvious that they are unrelated. Yet for the policy of P(switch)=1, the ev of the envelope and the ev of the policy with respect to the game are not the same thing.

Now imagine the wikipedia article for the Alaska problem variant of the two envelope problem. Do you really think everyone would be so focused on the EV of the envelope as the step that was wrong? How could they? We have the same paradox still, but there is no EV calculation for the envelope included in the problem. If we can remove the EV calculation, yet still have the same paradox, it seems to me the paradox is not the expected value calculation.

So what is my solution? Well, to actually find your correct policy function you need to get the argmax of the policy with respect to the game. There are multiple ways to do this:

- Reinforcement learning does it by finding argmax pi with respect to Q_pi(s, a) = R(s') + P(keep)Q_pi(s',keep) + P(switch) Q_pi(s', switch).

- Game theory sets it up a bit differently. You define a similar graph using a different formalism, but simplified to operate over information sets. You can use a thing called regret matching; basically it turns out that if you play in proportion your normalized counterfactual regret, the average of those policies is the optimal best response.

In both cases you need to do something about the fact you're actually on an infinite graph. So the actual solution in the general case looks very very different from their way of solving the problem. It isn't just simple probability; I mean, it is, but taking the limit of an infinite sequence and taking advantage of the properties of markov chains aren't usually what I think of when someone tells me that something is simple probability. That is one formalism. In the other, we do have simple probability, but it isn't necessarily obvious that the central limit theorem gives us the optimal policy when we play in proportion to not just our regret, but our counterfactual regret. So yes, simple probability, but also, most people who know simple probability don't necessarily even know what a counterfactual is. So maybe not that simple after all.

But lets say we stick to the problem. We are here to learn how to avoid this problem, right? Nope. If you don't do things like this, you'll just be wrong in more complicated situations. Because the EV of the envelope is not the EV of the game with respect to your policy. This gets increasingly true as your imperfect information games get more complicated; it is very true of complex real world situations. The value of a wallet with a hundred dollars in the real world is different depending on whether you got that wallet with a policy function of robbing people versus earning it at your work. I feel sticking to their formalism means you end up conceited with regard to your ability to protect yourself from this paradox, because you consider yourself a master of the expected value of the envelope, but you're still vulnerable to the paradox, because the expected value of the envelope isn't the expected value of the game with your policy. So sticking with the problem is the opposite of protecting yourself.

I'm so far from what they want the problem to focus on, but they are wrong to focus on that. They aren't protecting themselves from making the same mistake. They're dooming themselves to use the wrong tools for solving this problem.. So they will make this mistake and they'll even be more confident in themselves as they do it, because they were clever and did the wrong thing in a better way, calculating the EV correctly, but staying within the land of paradox despite that.

Re: Two envelopes problem

#317

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think this, because I disagree with most people here about what the actual paradox is. I think the paradox is that the algorithm equates the expected value of the contents of an envelope with the expected value of a policy choice for a player. When I correct what I feel is the root of the paradox, my solution drastically differs in fundamental ways such that the way the problem restricts to pointing out the wrong s…

With all due respect ... this is basic probability theory. It's not really controversial what the solution is. The article's failures are mainly pedagogical. We can agree that "the entire structure is wrong" because the "entire structure" is giving a wrong formula for the EV and saying "this is the formula for the EV." Yes, switching and not switching have the same EV and you can always switch.

[deleted]

Re: Two envelopes problem

#318

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think this, because I disagree with most people here about what the actual paradox is. I think the paradox is that the algorithm equates the expected value of the contents of an envelope with the expected value of a policy choice for a player. When I correct what I feel is the root of the paradox, my solution drastically differs in fundamental ways such that the way the problem restricts to pointing out the wrong s…

With all due respect ... this is basic probability theory. It's not really controversial what the solution is. The article's failures are mainly pedagogical. We can agree that "the entire structure is wrong" because the "entire structure" is giving a wrong formula for the EV and saying "this is the formula for the EV." Yes, switching and not switching have the same EV and you can always switch.

> We can agree that "the entire structure is wrong" because the "entire structure" is giving a wrong formula for the EV and saying "this is the formula for the EV."

We aren't in agreement about this. I realize we have to fix this, but fixing it doesn't resolve the paradox. It is a red herring.

> Yes, switching and not switching have the same EV and you can always switch.

With all due respect, this isn't true and asserting this doesn't resolve the paradox. See my other reply for why it doesn't resolve the paradox.

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