Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can use strace to get this information. Linux also offers seccomp and landlock which are very similar to pledge and unveil.
I would like to emphatically point out that: no, you can't. You can't use strace to get this information. Let's say you want to use seccomp to whitelist allowed syscalls. Your code opens a file, uses stat to get the file size, then mallocs that many bytes and reads the file contents into the buffer. Trivial program, right? glibc will turn open into openat, stat into statx, malloc can become either nothing, or sbrk, o…
SELinux is unmanageable; just turn it off if it gets in your way
441–450 of 461 posts
Re: SELinux is unmanageable; just turn it off if it gets in your way
#442Earlier quoted context omitted.
Also technology wise its not 2022 everywhere, if you know what i mean. Many poorer nations suffer from inferior infrastructure, which could mean slower loading / processing times for https based webpages. I remember reading an article along these lines a few years ago when arguing against using https absolutely everywhere.
Nope. SSL was pretty okay performance-wise 15 years ago. So no, we don't know what you mean. 'Poorer' infrastructure excuse is void. If we cared about performance we'd get rid of almost all javascript, not https.
Re: SELinux is unmanageable; just turn it off if it gets in your way
#443Earlier quoted context omitted.
The alternative, which is Linux, is to grant your calculator app the permissions to read and write to the same resources that your browser uses to store the password for your bank. Well "grant" is too strong of a word. "By default and there is nothing you can do about it unless you are exceptionally skilled" is more accurate. Also your calculator app can read your sudo password as you type it, which you do a dozen ti…
> Also your calculator app can read your sudo password as you type it True with X11. Fixed in Wayland.
Re: SELinux is unmanageable; just turn it off if it gets in your way
#444Earlier quoted context omitted.
Unless there's a vulnerability in something internet facing, you can go a very long time without updating anything. So, yes, it doesn't matter... except when it does. I've logged into production systems with multi year uptimes, with updates that haven't been applied in just as long. Many orgs have a if it's not broke, don't fix it policy. Applying needless updates are just as likely to screw something up.
Many orgs get breached (or have no way to detect if they've been breached). It depends on both your industry and your risk tolerance. We generally apply every security patch that comes along for RHEL. Application patching is different, it depends on the severity and what the vendor will support. If we can't patch, we try to apply compensating controls to mitigate the risk. And the pride we all used to have with long…
Re: SELinux is unmanageable; just turn it off if it gets in your way
#445Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'd generally agree with this, but for production use (where it'll be CRI-O or ContainerD in all likelihood) it's worth noting that using containers does increase your attack surface. We've had container breakout CVEs in the Kernel+ContainerD+CRI-O this year, and the ContainerD/CRI-O ones were not complex at all, so you do need to stay on top of patching as well as the other good practices mentioned.
A lot the container breakout CVEs do not affect a system that uses SELinux properly.
Definitely the CRI-O one (which is most likely to affect Red Hat based systems) was able to exploit a default OpenShift cluster in my testing.
Re: SELinux is unmanageable; just turn it off if it gets in your way
#446Earlier quoted context omitted.
Plus, it makes updating an application way more difficult: you need: - the distribution to recompile and test all binaries using a vulnerable dependency [x] - users to download and update all affected binaries compared to: - the distribution patching a single package - users updating that package Imagine if OpenSSL was statically linked: even the smallest fix would require users to update half of the OS. And that wou…
Why would you need to rebuild everywhere? Couldn’t you rebuild once in a trusted place and distribute signed binaries?
Re: SELinux is unmanageable; just turn it off if it gets in your way
#447Re: SELinux is unmanageable; just turn it off if it gets in your way
#448Earlier quoted context omitted.
I run thousands of severs. None of them have SELinux or systemd. It’s banned tech.
Well that just says nothing, it's not a sign for security or quality nor against it. I run around 600 jails (so obviously no systemd (FreeBSD)), but the host for sure has pretty tight MAC policies (and some jails too). What other MAC-System do you use? tomoyo? apparmor?
I wrote my own kernel modules that do exactly what I need in my stack and use case. No need for complicated SELinux, AppArmor or other solutions. I always roll my own solutions from the ground up (usually in a couple of all-nighters).
Re: SELinux is unmanageable; just turn it off if it gets in your way
#449Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why would you need to rebuild everywhere? Couldn’t you rebuild once in a trusted place and distribute signed binaries?
Distributions have their fleet of buildbots to do the latter.
Re: SELinux is unmanageable; just turn it off if it gets in your way
#450Earlier quoted context omitted.
Many orgs get breached (or have no way to detect if they've been breached). It depends on both your industry and your risk tolerance. We generally apply every security patch that comes along for RHEL. Application patching is different, it depends on the severity and what the vendor will support. If we can't patch, we try to apply compensating controls to mitigate the risk. And the pride we all used to have with long…
Security patches can be applied even to the kernel without restarting anything though, so having a high uptime is not mutually exclusive with staying up to date. Of course, you do have to pay extra for live patching.