Earlier quoted context omitted.
One side has a huge footprint to secure (software-system), because it's every way software could ever need to interact with a local system. The other can expose a much smaller one (container-system), because it only needs to include things one would have gone off-local-machine for (i.e. networking). So from a security boundary, containers are basically a machine-internal firewall between programs and the host.
> So from a security boundary, containers are basically a machine-internal firewall between programs and the host. Which is only useful if they actually provide security.
It's effectively impossible to ever provide security at the program-system interface, due to the surface area. (I.e. the SELinux problem)
The very concept of having a container (that internally simulates a system) creates fundamentally different opportunities that allow both (programs that work) and (security).
Whinging about whether or not current containers do a good or bad job of it is a less interesting, short term quibble.