Secure boot allows you to load your own keys. That's the way some Linux distros actually recommend you to set it up: sign your own bootloader, kernel, kernel modules, everything, and tell your motherboard to trust that. It's arguably even more secure than Microsoft's approach because anyone can boot a Windows install disk, but getting a boot drive with your signature on it requires breaking into your system. This could be a little challenging if you try to update firmware through manufacturer supplied boot images that expects their Microsoft signature to work, but it's not impossible to work around that.
For dual booting you'd need to load both sets of keys (your own and Microsoft's) or configure your primary bootloader to trust Microsoft's signature and chainload.
There's nothing inherently Microsoft related about secure boot, except for that on some Microsoft devices where the ability to use your own keys has been taken away from you. Don't buy a Microsoft Surface without checking its Linux limitations, basically, but that's a Microsoft problem, not a secure boot problem.
If you don't like being restricted, just turn off secure boot. Or turn off any verification that happens after secure boot; it's the Linux kernel that's enforcing drivers it loads to be signed, not the secure boot standard. Patch out the verification routine with a return true if you have to.
Everything will boot and load, which may or may not be a good thing, depending on your requirements.