Earlier quoted context omitted.
On consumer CPUs DRM may have been the only use case, and indeed good riddance. But on the server side it's possible for tenants to use these hardware features to run workloads that the hosts verifiably cannot modify or inspect. In other words, this lets you use AWS/GCP/Azure etc. while keeping both your data and your code competely opaque to Amazon/Google/Microsoft etc. Disclaimer: my job is to write the software th…
I'm sure you're already familiar, but for others, there is also AMD's SEV-SNP [0] and Intel's TDX [1] that solve similar problems. Azure has SEV-SNP VMs in preview [2] - full disclosure, I work at Microsoft and was involved in this :) [0] - https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthen... [1] - https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/t... [2] - https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/…
I think the biggest contribution that cloud providers can bring to the table in the mid-term is mitigation of the physical attack vector. This would involve inserting themselves as a second root of trust in attestations (SEV has explicit support for this), which would mean that a real world attack would require collusion of multiple parties (pick 2 of Hardware vendor, Cloud provider, Software vendor).