Earlier quoted context omitted.
Tapes are not that slow, 360MB/s per drive, and on a large scale swapping them is completely automatic.
In support of your point, 360MB/s is an extremely conservative estimate. I'd expect that from LTO-6, which is around ten years old, and I would certainly hope their backups are on more modern gear than that.
Atlassian: We estimate the rebuilding effort to last for up to 2 more weeks
191–200 of 260 posts
Re: Atlassian: We estimate the rebuilding effort to last for up to 2 more weeks
#192That would be too good to hope for.
Re: Atlassian: We estimate the rebuilding effort to last for up to 2 more weeks
#193As someone who is impacted, this is obviously immensely frustrating. Worse, outside of "we have rebuilt functionality for over 35% of the users", I haven't seen any reports from the people who have ostensibly been recovered. Next, their published RTO is 6 hours, so obviously they must have done something that completely demolished their ability to use their standard recovery methods: https://www.atlassian.com/trust/s…
RTO is so hard to state properly even with regular testing. If someone blows away a critical database, sure you can meet your published RTO. What if we lose 300 of our databases and need to copy snapshots from another region. AWS limits you to 20 concurrent snapshot copies cross region. Which of those databases should you do first? Do you know your entire dependency graph for all 1000 of your services to make the rig…
Re: Atlassian: We estimate the rebuilding effort to last for up to 2 more weeks
#194I bet they screwed up royally, deleted some data and are down to either rebuilding it from logs, caches or other side-effects, or using data recovery software on the storage drives (which might involve third-party companies). I can't see many other reasons why this should take 2 weeks.
Let me bet: Rebuilding from Jira email notifications. Yes, the diffs in the notifications.
Re: Atlassian: We estimate the rebuilding effort to last for up to 2 more weeks
#195Earlier quoted context omitted.
RTO is so hard to state properly even with regular testing. If someone blows away a critical database, sure you can meet your published RTO. What if we lose 300 of our databases and need to copy snapshots from another region. AWS limits you to 20 concurrent snapshot copies cross region. Which of those databases should you do first? Do you know your entire dependency graph for all 1000 of your services to make the rig…
For what you suggest some combination of these things should have happened. - Some employee has root access to AWS account and uses it operationally - Given wildcard S3 permissions to an IAM user and allowing delete bucket - Not enabled object versioning - Cross Region replication not enabled - no large bucket protection - don't have basic security monitoring and setup of Cloudtail alerts - have not invested in full…
Like most airliner accidents, this is probably an unfortunate combination of both of those things happening at the same time. My guess would be they have fairly decent planning overall but there's one (or more) small-ish areas where their planning is extremely poor - which crossed over with a screwup in a very specific fashion that laser focussed on that particular piece of poor planning. The "this can never happen" immovable object and the "You can't do that" irresistible force.
Re: Atlassian: We estimate the rebuilding effort to last for up to 2 more weeks
#196Earlier quoted context omitted.
What is hard deletion? You can restore rows from database files before vacuum runs. You can often restore data from disk sectors. Some people say SSD can remap sectors under your chair and you won't even know that your deleted data is there.
The law isn't a technical specification. You have to follow the spirit of the law. A soft deleted_at timestamp wouldn't be following the law in good faith. Having some data stuck in an unmapped section of an ssd would be within the spirit.
I agree that just having a deleted_at timestamp and old entries are never pruned would not be a good faith interpretation of the law.
Re: Atlassian: We estimate the rebuilding effort to last for up to 2 more weeks
#197Earlier quoted context omitted.
Last time I checked (a few months ago), Planner still could not be backed up. Like, at all. If someone went in and deleted a whole bucket you can't recover it, not natively, and not with third party. So that's a big fat no from me.
I seem to recall dumping Planner to JSON easily enough. I don't know if you can easily restore directly from its JSON, but the JSON was nice enough to work on for what little I needed to do with it. My current employer shut off Trello and forced us over to Jira and is threatening to disable Planner, so I'm "not allowed" to rely on Planner enough day-to-day so it's possible it is either better or worse than I remember…
Re: Atlassian: We estimate the rebuilding effort to last for up to 2 more weeks
#198As the person responsible for running Jira and Confluence on premises at my employer I‘m looking forward for the next time one of their sales droids contacts me to make us move to their cloud services (despite me stating that we are not interested multiple times)…
Re: Atlassian: We estimate the rebuilding effort to last for up to 2 more weeks
#199Earlier quoted context omitted.
Supposedly they’re having to basically restore everyone from backups because a system designed to delete old data was a bit more efficient than it should have been: https://reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/u14qqq/_/i4a0mk8/?con...
Reminder: never delete data for real as your first step. Always mark it deleted along with a time stamp saying when. Then you can hide deleted itemsfrom everything. When a maintenance script goes haywire you can fix the problem quickly. Have a daily job that really deletes records marked deleted after 30 days. If that is too complicated to retrofit then have any mass cleanup script move the records to a CSV file or t…
Re: Atlassian: We estimate the rebuilding effort to last for up to 2 more weeks
#200Earlier quoted context omitted.
The law isn't a technical specification. You have to follow the spirit of the law. A soft deleted_at timestamp wouldn't be following the law in good faith. Having some data stuck in an unmapped section of an ssd would be within the spirit.
IANAL, but IMHO a soft 'deleted_at' timestamp along with a daily cron job that hard deletes everything with a deleted_at older than 24 hours would fall within the spirit of the law. I agree that just having a deleted_at timestamp and old entries are never pruned would not be a good faith interpretation of the law.