Earlier quoted context omitted.
I've done startup engineering for a while. I've seen exactly 1 issue that we couldn't solve easily (N+1) or with simply turning our server count up (often way cheaper than putting an engineer to a problem). Basically, to move development velocity faster we "load everything". Seems like a really bad idea on the surface. In practice, we only ran into an issue with a single customer that was literally 1000x as large as…
Even before using more servers, one should consider using (one) bigger server (and another as backup). Massive servers are laughably cheap these days. E.g. 16 cores, 128GB RAM is €112 from Hetzner.
What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse of Fast
191–200 of 482 posts
Re: What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse of Fast
#192Earlier quoted context omitted.
> My company's strategy is get one extremely solid person across all our verticals (Android / iOS / Backend / Infra) to minimise communication overhead and maximise iteration speed (since we throw out half the code we write anyway). but ... but ... that makes sense ... I have found that having fewer good engineers is much better than lots of bad ones. That approach is treated as heresy, in today's tech industry.
Perhaps the thinking is that it's easier to hire multiple good-enough programmers to get dependable productivity, and to replace one if something goes wrong. In the extreme case, if a company has one programmer who is very good when they're working at peak productivity, but then they have a period of low productivity for whatever reason, that company is in trouble. I've been that person.
Re: What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse of Fast
#193I think the most applicable warning for engineers when it comes to the actual work, as opposed to whether one should join a particular startup, is this: > Engineers calculated the load Fast had in needing to serve their traffic. The Fast button was rendered less than 500,000 times per day - rarely needed to ever serve more than a few requests per second. > One of the few warning signs engineers noticed is how Fast sp…
Re: What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse of Fast
#194Earlier quoted context omitted.
And if you think this is undersized for comedic effect I did ops for a company that went from <1mil to 15mil revenue (with the same sales strategy of targeting lots of small clients) on 4 1u white label supermicros. Two app servers and two MySQL dbs. Never in my life had such reliable infrastructure.
Early in my career when in a discussion with my manager at the time, he threw out the "planes with two engines have twice as many failures as single engine planes" line. So in my now close to 30 years of experience later, working on systems expected to run 24/7/365, I can't tell you what percentage of failures and outages were caused by the redundancy/fail-over/etc software and hardware layered into a system, but its…
There has to be a smart reply to that, like: 100% of pilots of single engine planes don’t make it home after a single engine failure. 100% of pilots of dual engine planes do make it home after a single engine failure.
Re: What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse of Fast
#195Oof, just one of our customers pays about the same as their full revenue, and we're a cockroach team. The real thing here is they're not that surprising. A lot of companies with their kind of funding use enterprise sales to force say $5-10M ARR, but there's only so much VC money can force for a leaky funnel, broken product, and overall incorrect market + fit. I didn't appreciate this until maybe a year or two ago. Va…
Money is fungible
Re: What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse of Fast
#196The story is a lot more complicated and nuanced than the headlines you read in publications but I will say that Fast was full of really talented folks who I'd be happy to work with again. For me, a big lesson I took away from this experience is the perils of an overly positive fully remote culture. It's very easy for leadership to hide things from people when information doesn't easily spread across different organizations
Re: What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse of Fast
#197Earlier quoted context omitted.
May help explain some Meta offers I've seen... 2 years out of college? Sure, come as a Senior! That's not enough? Principal it is!
The problem is sometimes this is done for legitimate reasons and genuinely does lead to stronger outcomes for both employers and employees. It's hard to tell the difference between "stop the bleeding" title/pay inflation and "aggressively competing for talent" inflation.
Meta is ~$2M/employee. Probably more like $1M once contractors are accounted for? But for a good person, even if the rest of the company has random issues, they can carve out a win.
Fast was like $1K/employee
Consider what that's like for some hypothetical B2B startup BlitzScaler Inc. They're betting on 3x+ growth year-over-year for next 2+ years, 2-3 year sales payback periods, etc, and is probably closer to Fast levels of revenue per employee than Meta's. But hitting $500K is hard, $2M is hard again in different ways, then again to $10M, and again to $20M+ (and increasing range depending if many sales people inflating it). That matters because many aren't there, even unicorns (!). That means, like Uber, they're burning increasing piles of money, except unlike Uber, the revenue is unlikely to be keeping pace. Fundraising buys team, and an artificial sense of fit+growth (kool-aid-drinking team + forced sales that tap out + churn.)
A cockroach team is closer to Amazon style: reinvest ~100% in growth, but don't gamble your employee's stock options.
Re: What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse of Fast
#198Earlier quoted context omitted.
Perhaps the thinking is that it's easier to hire multiple good-enough programmers to get dependable productivity, and to replace one if something goes wrong. In the extreme case, if a company has one programmer who is very good when they're working at peak productivity, but then they have a period of low productivity for whatever reason, that company is in trouble. I've been that person.
Additionally, it's a bigger loss felt when that person leaves.
I kept engineers (really good ones) for decades. They had many "life problems" (like divorce, cancer, etc.) during that time, and I kept them on.
It's entirely possible. I have done it. I ran a team that was all "top-shelfers."
Re: What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse of Fast
#199Earlier quoted context omitted.
Lol. L6. Look no further folks. This guy Dominic was clearly LARPing a startup. Leveling frameworks before traction is a joke to me.
I completely disagree. They were 450 people with 150 engineers. If I had to guess I would bet the engineers clamored for leveling and it came from bottoms up requests and a need to be fair with compensation when hiring. Now to be clear they shouldn't have been that big (clearly), but leveling people was not the problem.
Re: What software engineers can learn from the rapid collapse of Fast
#200Earlier quoted context omitted.
Early in my career when in a discussion with my manager at the time, he threw out the "planes with two engines have twice as many failures as single engine planes" line. So in my now close to 30 years of experience later, working on systems expected to run 24/7/365, I can't tell you what percentage of failures and outages were caused by the redundancy/fail-over/etc software and hardware layered into a system, but its…
> "planes with two engines have twice as many failures as single engine planes" There has to be a smart reply to that, like: 100% of pilots of single engine planes don’t make it home after a single engine failure. 100% of pilots of dual engine planes do make it home after a single engine failure.