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Debian decides to allow secret votes

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Re: Debian decides to allow secret votes

#81
post #53

Earlier quoted context omitted.

3 > 2 > 4 is very clear in that it means "I would most prefer to reaffirm public voting, but I do support secret voting so long as verification is allowed. I oppose secret voting without verification.". It's a meaningful vote. Why are people disagreeing about this?

Because public voting is the status quo, so 3 & 4 are identical in what they would (not) change in the procedures. 3 is just an additional statement of support. If you support public voting (3) you also support 4 over 1/2.

Not necessarily. As I understand it, 4 (NOTA) is special, because in a vote to change the constitution of Debian, you need 3 times more votes for a change than NOTA votes. Thus 3 > 2 > 4 would mean "I prefer 3, but if the majority supports 2 I will side with them instead of against them". In this case, I can imagine people thinking "I personally think public voting is fine, but if a lot of people think we should have secret votes, I have no problem with changing the constitution to allow those."

Re: Debian decides to allow secret votes

#82
post #9

A brief summary because I had to re-read this a few times to figure out what was going on. Debian had a vote with 4 options: Option 1 "Hide identities of Developers casting a particular vote" Option 2 "Hide identities of Developers casting a particular vote and allow verification" Option 3 "Reaffirm public voting" Option 4 "None of the above" (NOTA) The objection raised here is that Option 3 and Option 4 can be consi…

Debian uses the Schulze method (if things haven't changed recently), so I do not see how that would have an impact on the result.

Because this is a constitution change, which requires a 3:1 super majority to change, a concept the Schulze method doesn’t really provide for.

The issues arises from how the 3:1 ratio is calculated. Which is by comparing the number of “change it” votes to the number of the “None of the above (NOTA)” votes (this is my understanding of from the email thread).

As a result the number of NOTA directly impacts the number to approval votes needed to win, as a simple majority isn’t enough. Thus having a NOTA option, and an option that looks like a NOTA can create confusion which splits the NOTA vote, because voting “keep public vote” above NOTA, which reduces the number of counted NOTA votes, and increases the number of “change it” votes (as all non-NOTA votes are considered “change it” votes, regardless of practical impact, at least that my understanding from the thread). Thus reduces number of approval votes need to achieve the super majority.

As this vote was won by a single vote, voter confusion on how choice ordering regarding the NOTA option could have swung vote against the intentions of the voting members.

Re: Debian decides to allow secret votes

#83
post #51

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> it's possible to check for yourself that your vote was actually counted and not ignored. That's a bug, not a feature. The point of not doing that with paper voting is that it makes selling your vote difficult, as nobody else can verify what you voted for. You on the other side know that you put the ballot in the box and can stay around to see if the votes in the box get accurately counted. With electronic voting yo…

>That's a bug, not a feature It's a trade off. I want to be able to prove that my vote was counted. How can I trust that my voice was actually heard by the system? >as nobody else can verify what you voted for. You can mitigate this problem by giving people a way to fake any vote outcome. The voter knows how to verify their actual vote, but someone else would not be sure if what they verified was real or fake. Also I…

> Also I doubt this type of buying votes with verification is that big of an actual thing. You can trivially do it with paper voting to by just asking them to stream themself voting or by taking a picture of their ballot.

It's not so much selling votes, as to discourage voter intimidation: The husband forces his wife, the boss forces his subordinates, the local mafia forces their victims to vote a particular way.

I don't know the rules in the USA, but in the UK it is generally forbidden to stream yourself voting or take a photo in the polling station. Maintaining the secrecy of ballots is high priority.

Someone might still privately take that picture of their ballot paper, after all there's a private voting booth; the officials wouldn't know. You're allowed to say you made a mistake and ask for a replacement ballot paper, so you could show your boss the version they want to see, and then vote differently.

Re: Debian decides to allow secret votes

#84
post #61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can already do that with mail in ballots easily. Someone could also threaten you to record yourself filling out a paper ballot.

Yes, which is why I also dislike postal voting and want to minimise its use.

What does postal voting have to do with that? they could also force you to film yourself at a polling station...

Re: Debian decides to allow secret votes

#85
post #9

A brief summary because I had to re-read this a few times to figure out what was going on. Debian had a vote with 4 options: Option 1 "Hide identities of Developers casting a particular vote" Option 2 "Hide identities of Developers casting a particular vote and allow verification" Option 3 "Reaffirm public voting" Option 4 "None of the above" (NOTA) The objection raised here is that Option 3 and Option 4 can be consi…

>If those two were represented as a single "NOTA" option, that option would have won the ballot in terms of votes.

Looks like Option 1 and 2 were similar enough to "split the vote" too. What would have happened if 1 and 2 were combined and 3 and 4 were combined?

Re: Debian decides to allow secret votes

#86
post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

do we elect Debian developers?

Exactly. I view DDs more as the citizens of a democracy, rather than the elected representatives of the citizens.

That is correct; the DDs are the citizens. The users don't get representatives in Debian. That's why I appreciate transparency.

Re: Debian decides to allow secret votes

#87
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I am not familiar with Debian's practices, but electronic voting can't work for a nation because: - centralization (there must be a central, corruptible place where the voters are authenticated or the votes are counted) - software is untrustable: https://www.win.tue.nl/%7Eaeb/linux/hh/thompson/trust.html The USA has had a Diebold voting scandal. Other countries are using a paper-based voting process which can be supe…

Electronic voting systems using zero knowledge proofs are superior to paper votes because it's possible to check for yourself that your vote was actually counted and not ignored. Paper voting is extremely expensive to scale compared to a website that lets you vote. Everyone could get a notification on their phone when they are asked to vote on something as opposed to having to fill out paper and send it somewhere to…

Electronic voting is very difficult to monitor and verify independently, especially when voter lists are not publicly available. It is difficult to verify whether turnout number is correct, and on the countrary it is easy to add millions of fictious voters and vote for them.

> it's possible to check for yourself that your vote was actually counted and not ignored.

Let's say you voted for candidate A and didn't find your vote. How can you prove that you really voted for A?

> Everyone could get a notification on their phone when they are asked to vote on something as opposed to having to fill out paper and send it somewhere to be counted.

Voting with such system is equivalent to publishing results without any actual voting.

Re: Debian decides to allow secret votes

#88
post #71

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> How can I trust that my voice was actually heard by the system? Most vote countings are public. I can go to my polling place, cast my vote, check that nobody tampers with the box, watch how they count every vote correctly, ensure that the written tallies are correct, and then verify that the central system tallies match with those I counted.

Great, ZKProofs present the possibility for everyone to do better than that with much less work.

With paper voting you can see that there are real people casting votes. With electronic voting it is trivial to add fictious voters and vote for them, especially in countries where voter lists are not published.

Re: Debian decides to allow secret votes

#89

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Debian uses the Schulze method (if things haven't changed recently), so I do not see how that would have an impact on the result.

Because this is a constitution change, which requires a 3:1 super majority to change, a concept the Schulze method doesn’t really provide for. The issues arises from how the 3:1 ratio is calculated. Which is by comparing the number of “change it” votes to the number of the “None of the above (NOTA)” votes (this is my understanding of from the email thread). As a result the number of NOTA directly impacts the number t…

But NOTA and Affirm the Public Vote are not the same. Choosing ATPV would have changed the constitution. NOTA would not have changed the constitution. If this were an American election full of idiots and people who have no idea what they are voting for, then the argument would have weight. These are people who follow the Debian source code debate close enough to give a shit and vote. They knew what they were doing.

Re: Debian decides to allow secret votes

#90

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Paper voting ensures privacy So do ZKP based voting systems. >voter verification What do you mean by this? If you mean signatures you can have people sign their signature on their phone or desktop. >I can actually show up and vote once every few years This is a lot of friction which prevents many people from voting.

> So do ZKP based voting systems. Assuming no vulnerabilities on the ZKP system, a perfect implementation and no information leak from other sources. > What do you mean by this? I assume that ensuring that the person voting is who they claim they are. If someone steals the certificates of that person, they could impersonate them. > This is a lot of friction which prevents many people from voting. In Spain (and I gues…

Government-issued certificates for electronic voting are a terrible solution because it is trivial to generate millions of certificates for fictious voters and vote in their name.
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