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Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?

eclecticlight.co

131–140 of 143 posts

Re: Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?

#131

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No. Why would you think that? It goes against everything they have stated and the designs of the software. They are heavily focused on keeping all of that on device.

I don't think it's far fetched at all, that they'd do that without mentioning it. It certainly phones home when you open Preview [1], what's another little ping when you're looking at CSAM or whatever else they've been instructed to look for? The recent debacle made it clear enough to me that the their privacy reputation is little more than carefully curated marketing, and they're likely under tremendous pressure fro…

> The recent debacle [...]

It's hard to argue that this "debacle" was not materially driven by the media, which did not accurate report the system's privacy protections, either because they did not understand them, or because they did not care to.

Re: Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?

#132

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I disagree. Suspicion is not the same as prosecuted, and every time someone "beats off" to an image of child sexual abuse, that child is re-victimised; every time. You'd rather 10 children be victimised than 1 person falls under suspicion? Ok...

>you’d rather 10 children be victimized Now you’re just arguing in bad faith.

> Now you’re just arguing in bad faith.

In what way? I'm just characterising you argument from the point of view of the victims of the crime, who you appear quite happy to throw under the bus.

Re: Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?

#133
post #121

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I disagree. Suspicion is not the same as prosecuted, and every time someone "beats off" to an image of child sexual abuse, that child is re-victimised; every time. You'd rather 10 children be victimised than 1 person falls under suspicion? Ok...

> You'd rather 10 children be [re-]victimised than 1 person falls under suspicion? Ok... Well yeah, mostly because I don't understand what you mean be "revictimization", but I can easily imagine what it's like to have such suspicions leaked to the angry mob.

I'm not sure what's difficult to understand about it.

How about we pivot to intimate image abuse (revenge porn). The argument is the same. The victims are re-victimised every time their intimate images are shared, for the victims it's always the same stress, shame, embarrassment, etc.

However apparently the damage is already done so there's actually no issues according to the other user so what's all the fuss about...

Re: Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?

#134

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think it's far fetched at all, that they'd do that without mentioning it. It certainly phones home when you open Preview [1], what's another little ping when you're looking at CSAM or whatever else they've been instructed to look for? The recent debacle made it clear enough to me that the their privacy reputation is little more than carefully curated marketing, and they're likely under tremendous pressure fro…

There is some reprieve by using a good firewall or even an off device firewall. However with many of these services if you try to kill them, they come back. If you delete them sometimes it will literally break your OS. Example, if you remove the ocsp daemon, you can’t start any program on your computer.

Also, Apple is making it virtually impossible to make changes to the OS now with the sealed system volume. We as the operator have no workable way of making changes there. You can do the whole bless thing but you have to boot into several modes several times. For every update. Otherwise it won't even boot.

I think this is a worrying development. Until now our computers were actually ours. Now they're controlled by the vendor, and looking over our shoulder.

I think using the user's own device to spy on them (whatever the reason!) is a big red line to cross. And puts this stricter control over the OS in a different perspective than just "security". I think either thing that plays into it is that Apple is now a content provider (Apple music and TV+). So they have another reason to keep us out to protect their DRM.

But anyway, good security should not have to imply trusting the vendor implicitly. Give us the ability to add our own signing key for files we want to modify, just like secure boot on Windows allows adding custom keys..

Re: Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?

#135
post #10

What's the right number of lives to destroy over false positives from an algorithm? Is it some number other than zero? Why or why not?

I'm more concerned with the fact that framing someone for real CSAM is nearly the perfect crime. Contract killers have to be up close and personal in meatspace and leave an actual homicide investigation in their wake. Someone half way around the world could be contracted to spearfish you, take over your phone/laptop then cause it to download actual CSAM. The first thing you'd know about it is when you were arrested,…

No post body was provided.

Re: Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?

#136
post #121

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> You'd rather 10 children be [re-]victimised than 1 person falls under suspicion? Ok... Well yeah, mostly because I don't understand what you mean be "revictimization", but I can easily imagine what it's like to have such suspicions leaked to the angry mob.

I'm not sure what's difficult to understand about it. How about we pivot to intimate image abuse (revenge porn). The argument is the same. The victims are re-victimised every time their intimate images are shared, for the victims it's always the same stress, shame, embarrassment, etc. However apparently the damage is already done so there's actually no issues according to the other user so what's all the fuss about..…

> I'm not sure what's difficult to understand about it.

I guess the difficult bit for me is that you talk about throwing victims under the bus, and letting them be "victimized" all over again, but I just don't understand how this solution helps victims at all. Here's the example in my head: imagine you're a victim of revenge porn. The police, using technology like the stuff Apple has developed, catch one random guy (out of hundreds or thousands more) in possession of this porn. The police probably won't tell you that they caught this guy. How does this event help you?

> there's actually no issues

It's not that there are no issues: the distribution of CSAM (and of revenge porn) are terrible crimes, and iirc they're increasing in prevalence. I just think that Apple's solution doesn't help victims, and seriously discomforts millions of people.

As you've seen, many people do see this as privacy invasion. The feeling that folks somewhere far away might be able to see your photos (even low resolution thumbnails) without your knowledge isn't a good feeling to inflict on the world. And the feeling that your phone could report you to the police at any time isn't a good feeling either, even if you know you've done nothing wrong.

Re: Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?

#137
post #124

I am using Little Snitch since version 2. Practically all my connections form MacOS to the mothership are stopped by default. I turn off the filter only for updates. I avoid in general Apple software (Preview, Photos, etc.). Macs are used only for work. My personal information or browsing is done only on Linux with Open Snitch and minimalistic install. In the new information landscape blind trust can be harmful.

One small suggestion, consider using tcpdump on your router to make sure LS is really stopping everything. Apple and Microsoft wised up to this some time ago and some things hook in the network stack after the application firewalls. If you spot something please report it to the Little Snitch developers.

The amount of data captured by tcpdump can be minimized by only capturing syn/fin/rst packets assuming proto 6 tcp.

  'tcp[tcpflags] & (tcp-syn|tcp-fin|tcp-rst) != 0'
And if capturing to a file one can also limit the total number of packets captured with

  -c 1000
This may be useful if you are also capturing proto 17 udp.

Re: Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?

#138
post #136

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not sure what's difficult to understand about it. How about we pivot to intimate image abuse (revenge porn). The argument is the same. The victims are re-victimised every time their intimate images are shared, for the victims it's always the same stress, shame, embarrassment, etc. However apparently the damage is already done so there's actually no issues according to the other user so what's all the fuss about..…

> I'm not sure what's difficult to understand about it. I guess the difficult bit for me is that you talk about throwing victims under the bus, and letting them be "victimized" all over again, but I just don't understand how this solution helps victims at all. Here's the example in my head: imagine you're a victim of revenge porn. The police, using technology like the stuff Apple has developed, catch one random guy (…

Maybe I should have been clearer, I'm not in support of this "solution" but rather more put off by the counter arguments that CSAM is gonna happen anyway there's no point in even trying to stop it. Or ignoring the victims of this disgusting crime. I'm simply trying to voice their side of this story, to put their perspective. I obviously can't comment on what the police will or won't do on victims behalf.

I value privacy above most things, for example you'll not find me on any social media platforms and the ones you do don't link together. If these people valued their privacy that much they'd not be using Apple devices and services in the first place is my thinking. I'm pretty sure Apple have full access to anything in iCloud which for most users is where all their stuff sits, where's the expectation of privacy?

Re: Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?

#139

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think it's far fetched at all, that they'd do that without mentioning it. It certainly phones home when you open Preview [1], what's another little ping when you're looking at CSAM or whatever else they've been instructed to look for? The recent debacle made it clear enough to me that the their privacy reputation is little more than carefully curated marketing, and they're likely under tremendous pressure fro…

> The recent debacle [...] It's hard to argue that this "debacle" was not materially driven by the media, which did not accurate report the system's privacy protections, either because they did not understand them, or because they did not care to.

Maybe. My awareness of it primarily came from this and other tech-minded sites, I'm not exactly sure what the media was saying about it. I understood the privacy protections but still found the features positively horrifying. I stopped using an iPhone and I stopped using iCloud on all devices because of that announcement.

Re: Is macOS Look Up Destined for CSAM?

#140

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think it's far fetched at all, that they'd do that without mentioning it. It certainly phones home when you open Preview [1], what's another little ping when you're looking at CSAM or whatever else they've been instructed to look for? The recent debacle made it clear enough to me that the their privacy reputation is little more than carefully curated marketing, and they're likely under tremendous pressure fro…

There is some reprieve by using a good firewall or even an off device firewall. However with many of these services if you try to kill them, they come back. If you delete them sometimes it will literally break your OS. Example, if you remove the ocsp daemon, you can’t start any program on your computer.

I did some testing yesterday. It used to be if you blocked 17.0.0.0/8 (or a more restrictive subset for OCSP) on your router, it would take ~30 seconds to open a program. It's a lot faster now. The only thing that really leaps out at me is some programs I haven't launched in a long time go through that "Verifying..." step to launch where it calculates checksums.
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