Making CRDTs Byzantine Fault Tolerant [pdf]
martin.kleppmann.com
Making CRDTs Byzantine Fault Tolerant [pdf]
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Re: Making CRDTs Byzantine Fault Tolerant [pdf]
#2[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UEAMfLPZZhE&list=PLeKd45zvjc...
Re: Making CRDTs Byzantine Fault Tolerant [pdf]
#3Martin's writing and explanation style is truly awesome! I read his book DDIA (Designing data intensive applications) and listened to his distributed systems class lectures [1]. It was a joy learning. I wish I had him or someone like him in graduate school. I would've probably taken all his courses :-). [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UEAMfLPZZhE&list=PLeKd45zvjc...
Re: Making CRDTs Byzantine Fault Tolerant [pdf]
#4Martin - thanks for all your cool work!
Re: Making CRDTs Byzantine Fault Tolerant [pdf]
#5DDIA is so good that I feel the same kind of anticipation I have as when waiting for a next in a series fantasy book to take me back to a parallel world with characters I've come to love and miss like one misses a good friend they haven't seen for a while.
Re: Making CRDTs Byzantine Fault Tolerant [pdf]
#6I recently finished a 2nd reading of DDIA and while listening to a podcast featuring an interview with Martin Kleppmann, I got so thrilled when he mentioned that he plans to release another book in the coming years. DDIA is so good that I feel the same kind of anticipation I have as when waiting for a next in a series fantasy book to take me back to a parallel world with characters I've come to love and miss like one…
Re: Making CRDTs Byzantine Fault Tolerant [pdf]
#7I'm confused - probably because I haven't finished reading the paper.
1. Sybil-proof-ness requires a CA [1]. It's orthogonal to whether or not a protocol is BFT. Specifically, the classical BFT protocols "assume" there exist a CA, and then prove their protocols to be BFT.
2. I won't comment whether 3f+1 protocols cannot be deployed in open P2P systems (they can), but "makes no assumption about the number of Byzantine nodes" is weird. This result is valid in a particular system/time model eg. With PKI, in synchronous setting, for any `f` one can achieve consensus in `f+1` rounds using Dolev-Strong. This means you make no assumption about `n`, but the protocol is impractical for variety of reasons eg. large `n`, strong synchrony etc.
[1] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/...
Re: Making CRDTs Byzantine Fault Tolerant [pdf]
#8I recently finished a 2nd reading of DDIA and while listening to a podcast featuring an interview with Martin Kleppmann, I got so thrilled when he mentioned that he plans to release another book in the coming years. DDIA is so good that I feel the same kind of anticipation I have as when waiting for a next in a series fantasy book to take me back to a parallel world with characters I've come to love and miss like one…
Re: Making CRDTs Byzantine Fault Tolerant [pdf]
#9> The 3f + 1 assumption means these protocols cannot be deployed in open peer-to-peer systems, since they would be vulnerable to Sybil attacks. In contrast, my approach makes no assumption about the number of Byzantine nodes. I'm confused - probably because I haven't finished reading the paper. 1. Sybil-proof-ness requires a CA [1]. It's orthogonal to whether or not a protocol is BFT. Specifically, the classical BFT…
Re: Making CRDTs Byzantine Fault Tolerant [pdf]
#10> The 3f + 1 assumption means these protocols cannot be deployed in open peer-to-peer systems, since they would be vulnerable to Sybil attacks. In contrast, my approach makes no assumption about the number of Byzantine nodes. I'm confused - probably because I haven't finished reading the paper. 1. Sybil-proof-ness requires a CA [1]. It's orthogonal to whether or not a protocol is BFT. Specifically, the classical BFT…
The big novel feature in Nakamoto consensus (the Bitcoin paper one) is precisely that it gives you Sybil-proof BFT without a CA. That's the whole reason for the massive energy consumption.