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F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

wonderfall.dev

21–30 of 69 posts

Re: F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

#21
The article links to "The PGP Problem" in an attempt to suggest that GPG signatures are bad somehow. Here are my comments on "The PGP Problem":

* https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=pgpfan:tpp

The article also claims that Debian has moved away from GPG signatures. This is not true.

This all seems like a pointless distraction from the point that article is attempting to make...

Re: F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

#23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Doesn't google do exactly the same thing with the app store anyway?

Yes, last I checked, Google signs the app with your private key, which they force you to give them. In other words, they have the ability to make any changes to your app and re-sign it at their whim. Anyone concerned about the security of their shit should only install apps directly signed directly by the developer, using a private key only the developer possesses. It's a shame these platforms go to such great length…

Playing devil's advocate, given the choice between trusting a random developer to keep their keys private or Google to keep their keys private, I'd probably side with Google.

Yeah that doesn't help with coercion or government letters, but neither would being a solo dev, both parties will comply.

Re: F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

#24
post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, last I checked, Google signs the app with your private key, which they force you to give them. In other words, they have the ability to make any changes to your app and re-sign it at their whim. Anyone concerned about the security of their shit should only install apps directly signed directly by the developer, using a private key only the developer possesses. It's a shame these platforms go to such great length…

Playing devil's advocate, given the choice between trusting a random developer to keep their keys private or Google to keep their keys private, I'd probably side with Google. Yeah that doesn't help with coercion or government letters, but neither would being a solo dev, both parties will comply.

I don't think the concern is with Google keeping the keys secure. I think the concern is with Google being able to rewrite the app however they want and sign it without the developer even knowing.

Re: F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

#25

> 3. Low target API level (SDK) for client & apps Yeah well Google fucked up and removed a lot of important API stuff that supported tools. So I'll continue to use termux from F-Droid. Otherwise I might as well not have a phone.

Yup. Raising the target SDK means that more phones become ewaste, not because of their hardware becoming outdated, but because their software will never receive an update.

Re: F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

#26
post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, last I checked, Google signs the app with your private key, which they force you to give them. In other words, they have the ability to make any changes to your app and re-sign it at their whim. Anyone concerned about the security of their shit should only install apps directly signed directly by the developer, using a private key only the developer possesses. It's a shame these platforms go to such great length…

Playing devil's advocate, given the choice between trusting a random developer to keep their keys private or Google to keep their keys private, I'd probably side with Google. Yeah that doesn't help with coercion or government letters, but neither would being a solo dev, both parties will comply.

Except the developers can still have access to the key, they just have to share it with Google. This not only violates the old advice: "Never share your private key!", it also gives you the worst of both worlds: You have to trust both the random developer and Google to keep the keys private.

Re: F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

#27
post #5

> [devs] have to maintain a slightly different version of their codebase that should comply with F-Droid’s requirements Perhaps that's because I've got half a foot in the foss community and you don't hear a lot of "fml why is f-droid so strict about not using secret code", but to me it seems much more often that people complain about Google's policies than about F-Droid's. Especially since F-Droid's > “quality contro…

The main problem with downloading APKs from the GitHub releases page, is that it doesn't come with a low-friction way of distributing updates. This is especially important for unofficial client apps like NewPipe, which basically become bricked at a moment's notice, and updating within a day or two is important to maintain continuity of service.

Not to mention that an app may be hosted on a different platform, perhaps one that doesn't do auto-builds. Or, as was already pointed out, builds do exist but contain telemetry or secret code. In that case, a trusted intermediary (which I trust heck of a lot more than Google) that pulls and compiles the code and then distributes it, is a strictly value-added proposition.

Re: F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

#28
post #7

Not to discredit the article, but it would be nice to know from the get-go that it's written by a contributor to GrapheneOS and gives a plug to their upcoming App Repository at the end.

I was already under the impression that the GrapheneOS developer(s) were overworked, but still they insist in doing everything themselves because no other project is good enough

I have been using for the past year, and the 'advanced' user experience is not great. Updates are forced to the latest version of android, does not seem safe, and definitely does not feel stable, less customization than other roms, a bit aggressive towards root

I will probably go back to lineageos microg f-droid and some hardened configurations

F-Droid is provides invaluable service for android, privacy, open-source, android developers. GrapheneOS seems like an exercise in craziness a bit to extreme for me

Re: F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

#29
post #11
post #3

Given the amount of malware in the play store, I'm not sure about this...

It is addressed in the article. The point is that F-Droid weakens Android's security model, in other words, F-Droid requires more trust on your part. I think it is reasonable to trust the somewhat niche open source community more than the most popular and therefore the most attacked app store. You may also not want to feed Google, but it doesn't change the fact that F-Droid is technically less secure. The article's d…

But it's irrelevant trust. Stuff about signatures and specific practices. What makes F-Droid more secure are the kind of apps that are in it, that the apps are FOSS alone makes it less likely for spyware to be added to them. Sure it can still happen and then F-Droid's security practices become relevant. But each time you install an app, there is more trust you can give to an app in F-Droid, than the basically zero trust you can give to proprietary app in the play store.

The article is completely baffling in not really covering that. "strong security and privacy guarantees" mean jack shit when the game from the play store starts leaking all data it can grab or adds bank phishing - and it will have a bunch of permissions anyway, it legitimately needs them to function.

Re: F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

#30
1) In the FOSS culture, there are higher standards around keeping devices functioning for longer, compared to commercial ecosystems. Enforcing a higher target SDK version improves "security" (whatever threat model that's supposed to protect me against), at the cost of turning more old Android phones into e-waste. Even Android 4 phones are still usable if permanently plugged in (to counteract battery degradation), and their hardware specs are still perfectly capable of functioning as a 720p YouTube machine, an internet radio, or whatever else comes to mind.

2) One person's overly broad API permissions are another person's gateway to programming an awesomely powerful application. Having my storage API taken away for an entire Android release because "hurr durr, security, we'll fix it in the next sprint" and not being able to use a file manager other than the meager thing I had included with my OS showed me how true that is.

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