As for point one: I'm not talking about client/server access to services. I'm talking about the capacity for endpoints to talk to each other. IPv4 would be fine if we want a fully centralized computing infrastructure where everything is only a thin client, but that's a future with zero privacy or personal freedom.
I don't think there's anything special about IPv4 in terms of DDOS mitigation. What you're probably seeing is an artifact of focus and investment. IPv4 is still the lowest common denominator standard. Virtually everyone can talk to an IPv4 endpoint. As a result the DDOS protection services still mostly use IPv4 endpoints because it reduces the amount of attack surface they have to protect. If they were dual-stack they would have to deal with BGP black holing on what amounts to two BGP networks instead of just one.
DDOS is something that desperately needs a more comprehensive solution, but it's a hard problem to solve. Right now the solution is for DDOS protection services to run bastions with enough bandwidth to absorb attacks, but that's a solution that constricts innovation tremendously. I feel like a permanent solution would require cryptography to be designed into the entire network so that you could do things like rate limit packets to your host for people who didn't present a certificate. That would require a deep redesign of the entire network though, and that's not going to happen.