Earlier quoted context omitted.
Speaking more broadly than capital markets, it can result in more economically efficient outcomes, especially when some economic agents create disproportionately large negative externalities for others. For OneChronos, we're a uniform price clearing mechanism that will eventually support submarkets, which can enable (among other things) what's effectively a mutual opt-in repeated play game of reputation and the abili…
I won't pretend to understand all of this. Despite having worked in systematic equities trading group, I don't have a deep understanding of market micro-structure. I do appreciate your responding to my question. I find the technology and ideas you're bringing to market incredibly fascinating. I can't wait to see what comes of this!
Launch HN: OneChronos (YC S16) – Combinatorial auctions market for US equities
101–110 of 121 posts
Re: Launch HN: OneChronos (YC S16) – Combinatorial auctions market for US equities
#102I don't understand what you do but congratulations on not dying despite the apparent difficulties that have occurred thus far. Many would have given up.
Re: Launch HN: OneChronos (YC S16) – Combinatorial auctions market for US equities
#103For those who want a rough programming analogy here -- this sounds like support for multi-row transactions in a SQL database where only single row edits were allowed before. Now you can describe "buy goods A and B at $10 maximum, commit" and have the transaction either succeed or fail. Before you had to edit those rows individually and there's risk that you end up in a weird partial state, hence having to lower your…
Re: Launch HN: OneChronos (YC S16) – Combinatorial auctions market for US equities
#104Re: Launch HN: OneChronos (YC S16) – Combinatorial auctions market for US equities
#105Earlier quoted context omitted.
How does this sit with other innovations such as all to all trading in OTC markets that are designed to match many buyer/sellers at, for example, a mutually beneficial mid price?
The products that still trade predominately {OTC, bilateral, non-electronic} do because non-price factors, trading conventions, and counterparty risk make it difficult or impossible to trade on a central exchange. Expressive Bidding and a mechanism that allows for matching market dynamics (OneChronos) will enable electronification and more active trading in these markets. Ten years ago, I would have said that there w…
The most interesting aspect of this is that its enabled non-dealer non-dealer trading via certain venues.
Re: Launch HN: OneChronos (YC S16) – Combinatorial auctions market for US equities
#106I will consider myself an accomplished person the day I'm able to understand this post :) No offence but tbh, when I read through this, I felt a deja vu of coming across another Theranos. Some super innovative sounding complex tech which ultimately turns to be a total dud.
Re: Launch HN: OneChronos (YC S16) – Combinatorial auctions market for US equities
#107For those who want a rough programming analogy here -- this sounds like support for multi-row transactions in a SQL database where only single row edits were allowed before. Now you can describe "buy goods A and B at $10 maximum, commit" and have the transaction either succeed or fail. Before you had to edit those rows individually and there's risk that you end up in a weird partial state, hence having to lower your…
Re: Launch HN: OneChronos (YC S16) – Combinatorial auctions market for US equities
#108Re: Launch HN: OneChronos (YC S16) – Combinatorial auctions market for US equities
#109How do you deal with best execution obligations for the "legs" of your trades?
What market data do you publish about your order book?
Re: Launch HN: OneChronos (YC S16) – Combinatorial auctions market for US equities
#110Sounds very interesting -- congrats on making to here, must be super exciting. A couple of questions: How do you deal with best execution obligations for the "legs" of your trades? What market data do you publish about your order book?
Excellent question. Each leg of the trade comes in as an individual limit order with a price/quantity bound on it. This makes it easy for brokers to satisfy their 15c3-5 requirements since Expressive Bidding can only further restrict these limits. We clear the auction with a constraint that bounds the clearing region to the NBBO, snapshotted at the start of each auction. Rule 611 affords up to 1s if the market moves while we're optimizing, and away market movement has no average effect on execution quality, as auction start times are random and orders are firm.
In the future, we'll do ISO sweeps, but their usefulness is somewhat limited since getting fills from a sweep can change what's feasible for the auction. As we gather data on how folks use us, we'll hone on other regulatory options.
> What market data do you publish about your order book?
We report fills to the TRF to satisfy regulatory reporting requirements, but we're entirely dark otherwise.