I do Brazilian Jiu Jitsu and a common submission technique is to cut off blood flow to the brain (known as a blood choke). I've lost consciousness twice after being put into a blood choke. The experience of regaining consciousness is visceral. For those that haven't experienced it, it's very much like a turning on a computer. Initially, your brain does not (or cannot) process input like vision, sound, touch, etc. Slo…
I have orthostatic hypotension, which doesn't affect me as much since I've gained weight, and I've lost consciousness from standing to quickly up, but sometimes it doesn't all go away. I black out, a moment later I am somewhere, I don't know who I am or where I am, a moment later the rest fills in. The way I understand it as the blood pressure drops your brain stops to function properly but it might still somewhat fu…
What’s so hard about understanding consciousness?
381–390 of 393 posts
Re: What’s so hard about understanding consciousness?
#382I do Brazilian Jiu Jitsu and a common submission technique is to cut off blood flow to the brain (known as a blood choke). I've lost consciousness twice after being put into a blood choke. The experience of regaining consciousness is visceral. For those that haven't experienced it, it's very much like a turning on a computer. Initially, your brain does not (or cannot) process input like vision, sound, touch, etc. Slo…
This reminds me of standing up too fast
Re: What’s so hard about understanding consciousness?
#383Earlier quoted context omitted.
All knots can be untied, if that is what you choose to do. But not everybody chooses that. Thus far you have not chosen that. "Noticing yourself" is something literally everyone does. Not everyone ties themselves in knots. The alternative to tying yourself in knots is to think clearly without inventing falsehoods. "P-zombies" is just another word for solipsism. The moment somebody proposes either, you know there will…
P-zombies and solipsism are two totally different things.
Re: What’s so hard about understanding consciousness?
#384Earlier quoted context omitted.
> No, it's actually, "ta-da, we're not conscious! but here's why we think we are!" And of course the "think" has a quality to it that the hard problem is about. It's interesting how illusionists and eliminativists explain away aspects of SE by invoking (other) aspects of SE. "You merely have an illusion of being conscious" - that illusion is the hard problem, so now explain that illusion. I could be having an illusio…
> It's interesting how illusionists and eliminativists explain away aspects of SE by invoking (other) aspects of SE. "You merely have an illusion of being conscious" - that illusion is the hard problem, so now explain that illusion. I've explained this elsewhere, but will repeat here: this argument relies on a definition of "illusion" that begs the question on the existence of a subject, just like Descartes. Define i…
No, it's not like that at all. We're not discussing the dinosaur. We're discussing the existence of hallucinations (and SE in general). The dinosaur is irrelevant; the fact that it was possible to have the experience is the central question.
Again, this comes back to my fundamental argument with Dennett (and one that he graciously conceded in an email back in the 90s; not sure he would do so now): trying to figure out what it is that we are conscious of, rather than how we are conscious of anything at all. I'm 110% ready to concede that everything we are conscious of is an illusion, an error, a projection, an intent-laden stance etc. I'm 110% ready to concede that everything we think we experience as a "self" is wrong.
None of that helps to explain how experience is possible. So you're either denying that SE exists, or like Dennett insisting that mysterious SE can be explained by non-mysterious stuff.
Re: What’s so hard about understanding consciousness?
#385Earlier quoted context omitted.
> And I'd say you're just telling yourself a retroactively edited story that there is a singular subjective experience in order to make sense of our own thoughts and behaviours So look, "The Intentional Stance" is for me one of the most important books I've ever read in this general area, and I totally buy all the stuff Dennett and others have built up around the idea that what we are conscious of is an edited, self-…
> In the quote I included above, who is the "you" that is telling and who is the "yourself" that is being told? This is still begging the question by the use of "who". There is no "who", there is no self, there are only thoughts that refer to a "self", but the referrant does not actually exist in the way that's implied by these thoughts; there's no spirit or homunculus in your mind to which "self" actually refers. >…
> We argue that the attention schema theory provides a possible answer to the puzzle of subjective experience. The core claim of the theory is that the brain computes a simplified model of the process and current state of attention, and that the content of this model is the basis of subjective reports.
Sure, that's all fine. Subjective reports are interesting. But they are not the same as subjective experience. What we say about what we experience is no doubt complex, and has a complex relationship with actual brain behavior. But consciousness, at its heart, is not about what we report, it's about the experience of being something.
Re: What’s so hard about understanding consciousness?
#386Earlier quoted context omitted.
Where does that false conclusion occur? What is the entity in which it occurs? There is no "conclusion" here in the sense of "2+2=4". What is at stake is not a reasoned, or evidential analysis of how the world is. It is, rather, that subjective experience exists (we know it exists because we have subjective experience, and whether the experience is of something invented and false does not change the fact that the exp…
> It is, rather, that subjective experience exists (we know it exists because we have subjective experience, and whether the experience is of something invented and false does not change the fact that the experience exists). What is in dispute here is what "subjective experience" means . If we both agree that "subjective experience" is a phenomenon that can in principle be captured by a third person objective descrip…
Now we get to the heart of it (and the reason why consciousness is and has been such a difficult problem): I do not agree that this is true.
Re: What’s so hard about understanding consciousness?
#387Earlier quoted context omitted.
Well, being on delay doesn't detract from consciousness. Think of it this way: No matter how incredibly fast a monstrous AI ever becomes, it will always suffer some delay. >> in which world I am the first seconds after the alarm clock rings. Do you actually believe those are real, other worlds? I'm tempted to, sometimes. But if they are, it's more an argument that consciousness is real and something even grander than…
> Do you actually believe those are real, other worlds? Logically this depends of how do you define a world. Even if you imagine them as parallel universes with physics similar or mindboggingly dissimilar to that of our world, you can still say there is just one world in which all these sub-worlds exist. So, talking seriously I wouldn't say there are other worlds or there are not. I would just say "observable world"…
>> Believing these limitations don't render us futile in trying to understand all the phenomena of existing universe and their nature seems absurdly naïve to me.
I don't so much agree. Yes, "all the phenomena" may never be understandable. But if I think about the cognitive ability we have now (to look at a star and understand it's plasma; what plasma is; to see that the sun rises and know we are rotating on an axis while orbiting it; to be able to visualize where we are on that axis and plane; to move electrons around tiny circuits, create images and sound by controlling these things we can't see) it seems to me that you could have looked at humans 10,000 years ago and thought they would never be able to understand these things, but we're not very different from them. I'm less pessimistic on it. I think if we have another 10,000 years we'll probably be quite good at understanding the universe. Maybe even the universe of dreams?
Re: What’s so hard about understanding consciousness?
#388Earlier quoted context omitted.
And then step into the Star Trek transporter. :) You're obliterated, then perfectly reassembled on the other side. Is that still "you", "subjectively"? Should you or others even care about that question? And, if not, damn, that's ego-killing af.
Here's a thought experiment. You're going to use a Star Trek teleporter-like device to make an exact copy of yourself. What are the odds that you end up being the copy? Or rather, what should you believe the odds are that you will be the copy? Of course, I , the original, will not be the copy, but if I go in knowing I'm not the copy, the the copy will come out knowing he's not the copy. Thus, you should go in believi…
Re: What’s so hard about understanding consciousness?
#389Earlier quoted context omitted.
> The question is, why did the FPV-experiencing consciousness happen to bind to the body you are in? And why does it stick? You're asking questions equivalent to "why does the interior of a box happen to bind to that particular piece of folded cardboard? And why is the same interior there when the box is closed and reopened?" If each brain has a consciousness, and each is uniquely generated by that brain, the 'bindin…
That line of explanation doesn't do it for me, because there is only one brain that has my FPV consciousness. Why this particular one? I think it's a question related to the topics of breaking symmetry, or nondeterminism. It's also a great unsolved question that many smarter people than me couldn't answer so I'm not hopeful I'll live to see it answered. But I will continue to wonder at it now and then, like when arti…
Re: What’s so hard about understanding consciousness?
#390Earlier quoted context omitted.
> there is only one brain that has my FPV consciousness. Why this particular one? to me, the answer is because you were born with that one. Maybe it's better to think about how your FPV consciousness didn't exist prior to your birth. It came into being when you came into being. I don't think there's a separation between your FPV consciousness and physical brain. If your metabolism stops your FPV consciousness stops
> Maybe it's better to think about how your FPV consciousness didn't exist prior to your birth That is unknowable though. You may just not remember it. Is memory what makes consciousness?