Note that among a sea of tracked browsers, the untrackable browser shines like a bright star. Statistical analysis of these values over time (matched with client hints, ETags, If-Modified-Since, and IPs) will make most browsers uniquely identifiable. If the malicious vendor is good, they even correlate the size and order of requests. Because that's unique as well and can identify TOR browsers pretty easily. It's like…
No-JavaScript Fingerprinting
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Re: No-JavaScript Fingerprinting
#52Note that among a sea of tracked browsers, the untrackable browser shines like a bright star. Statistical analysis of these values over time (matched with client hints, ETags, If-Modified-Since, and IPs) will make most browsers uniquely identifiable. If the malicious vendor is good, they even correlate the size and order of requests. Because that's unique as well and can identify TOR browsers pretty easily. It's like…
I think it would be, for the most part, trivial to make a text-based or extremely stripped down browser on top of existing projects, if you had the contracts mapped for appropriate code generation. There are IDLs for most Web APIs, so that is a head-start.
I think this would be achievable, but not as a browser that most people would want to use.
Re: No-JavaScript Fingerprinting
#53Earlier quoted context omitted.
On many websites, you will literally be the only person doing that. This is a unique fingerprint. This might not matter to you, since it sounds like privacy isn’t your primary motivation here, but it is worth pointing out that custom patched browsers are going to be more fingerprinted, not less.
Yes, I understand some HN readers have this thought. I have gotten similar replies before. However, consider that I only send two to three headers: Host, Connection and (optionally) Cookie. There is nothing unique about the text-only browser by virtue of the patches. The TCP connetion and TLS is handled by a proxy. Sometimes I send the TCP requests with netcat, tcpclient, socat, etc. Then I open the HTML file with th…
I sympathize with the people who are going for pure anonymity. If I could be anonymous and still have a usable web, then I would do that. If you really think you'll learn something about me by tracking me, then whatever. I have still never been served a relevant ad in my life, so, uh, great job there. But in the end I just don't want to see all the shitty ads.
I would be interested to know what these people think they know about me. Based on my experience as a cognitive scientist, I suspect they know an awful lot less than they think they know ... or at least claim in their sales pitches to advertisers.
Re: No-JavaScript Fingerprinting
#54Cool. I get a different fingerprint every time. Although that doesn't prove that I'm not fingerprintable by this approach (one difference may be responsible for changing the hash), I'm kind of pleased. My setup: - Firefox - Enhanced Tracking Protection - uBlock Origin - NoScript - Privacy Badger - Privacy Possum - HTTPS Everywhere - Clear URLs - Decentraleyes - Smart Referer - JavaScript Restrictor
Not familiar with Privacy Badger or Privacy Possum, but I'm guessing they are what's subverting this technique? The other ones probably don't come into play.
Re: No-JavaScript Fingerprinting
#55I have Firefox RFP enabled, and as far as I know all these values will be the same across RFP users except the size of the browser window (which seems like a poor fingerprinting metric given the fact I can and do resize my browser during usage) - and maybe pixel density? (can't tell if this one is standardized or not). If there are any other RFP users out there compare to mine and see if you get anything different ot…
Re: No-JavaScript Fingerprinting
#56Re: No-JavaScript Fingerprinting
#57Fennec on Android: cdec914cb91d1a88fbd3e7834b7968c8
Re: No-JavaScript Fingerprinting
#58Re: No-JavaScript Fingerprinting
#59How practical would this method of recognising your fingerprint with CSS be?
Re: No-JavaScript Fingerprinting
#60Note that among a sea of tracked browsers, the untrackable browser shines like a bright star. Statistical analysis of these values over time (matched with client hints, ETags, If-Modified-Since, and IPs) will make most browsers uniquely identifiable. If the malicious vendor is good, they even correlate the size and order of requests. Because that's unique as well and can identify TOR browsers pretty easily. It's like…
I didn't review the linked projects, but isn't the "untrackable" browser one that does not implement or spoofs most APIs? I think it would be, for the most part, trivial to make a text-based or extremely stripped down browser on top of existing projects, if you had the contracts mapped for appropriate code generation. There are IDLs for most Web APIs, so that is a head-start. I think this would be achievable, but not…
Exactly. One of the reasons was that WebKit implements its APIs based on the WebIDL schema files (iirc Firefox does this too since Aurora).
Though the C++ code generator is a real old perl script, it's generally feasible to spoof the APIs as they would behave while providing behaviour profiles of the most commonly used web browsers (e.g. chrome/edge on windows).
The real challenge is to implement behaviour profiles that are also timing specific because some Browsers have different timings in incognito mode vs. normal mode due to how the memory is allocated directly in-RAM. That's usually how incognito mode Browsers are identified by recaptcha.