> What isn't occurring, is a good-faith discussion on solving the issues faced by law enforcement and the IC
Public policy orgs like EFF etc have proposed modifications to limit the most disastrous elements of this proposal but to the extent those proposals fix or limit the 'accidental' limitless liability for communications platforms, they are met only with disingenuous cries of "think of the children." I think it's pretty clear the lack of "good-faith discussion" lies with the people who've never openly acknowledged what all this is really about.
> even by those in the IC.
Hopefully the intelligence community, as opposed to the domestic law enforcement agencies, already understands how dangerous this legislation could be for U.S. national interests. The unintended consequences won't stop at social media. Platforms of all kinds will react to the liability exposure or merely the possibility of it. With other nations imposing their own in-country data requirements on trans-national platforms how many platforms (or their upstream technology providers) will maintain a separate insecure version for domestic tapping and a robustly secure version for international use? Just like our own backdoors being used against us, we've already seen how this kind of thing has a way of undermining our own security. Short-sighted bureaucrats are playing with fire here.
> too many folks defend their position from libertarian ideals
I don't see how this is tied to uniquely libertarian ideals. The 4th amendment prohibition on government search of citizen's "papers and property" isn't some aspirational ideal or partisan political viewpoint - it's always been at the very core of the nation. It's also been continuously endorsed by both liberal and conservative supreme courts for hundreds of years.
> that most folks in govt are just doing their job.
To the extent their actions undermine the constitution, it's no longer "law enforcement". Sadly, quite the opposite. If the law is the 'operating system', then the constitution is the 'secure kernel' - the last line of defense against both external AND internal threats capable of undermining the integrity of the entire system. Law enforcement has privileged accounts which are THE primary internal threat the secure kernel was designed to stop. From day one in the 1700s, the constitution has always made the job of law enforcement MUCH harder. That's not a bug. It's "As Designed" and perma-marked by the original designers (and the maintainers in SCOTUS) as "Won't Fix". Hell, it goes beyond just a feature - limiting the power of the government is the explicitly stated purpose of the thing - to the extent it puts a big fence around the few powers granted to government (with the barbs pointed inward) and grants everything else, mentioned or not, as powers granted to citizens.
It's always been well understood, as well as taught in elementary school, that the unique freedoms the country was founded on came with a cost - and sometimes that cost would be high, but... preserving these freedoms, including making things harder on law enforcement (and potentially easier on criminals), was worth the cost. I suspect congress is going to be surprised by how non-partisan (and non-negotiable) the fundamental integrity of the system is for most users.