OCSP Must-Staple is just another name for "really short certificate expiration periods"
Must-Staple with a timeout of X seconds is functionally equivalent to a certificate with a validity time of X seconds. In either case you need to go fetch something from the CA every X seconds, or else get booted off the net. The only difference is what you call that thing.
HN is doing its silly "slow down" nonsense, so I will reply to the reply below by editing here.
To @cmeacham98: I'm not moving the goalposts; all practical revocation schemes fail open. OCSP Must-Staple
isn't actually a form of revocation; it is just expiry with a fancy name and lots of extra complexity.
The implementation quirks of one particular CA (LE) are not features of these protocols; they are features of that particular CA's policies.
To @mhils: CAs could easily stand up simple servers that let you ask for the most recent certificate (if any) issued to a given domain and public key.
They don't want to do this because it's a burden. The only reason they run OCSP servers is that they're under pressure from insurers, regulators, and auditors to participate in the whole revocation theater game. Saying "we don't do revocation" would cause people to freak out, and setting up an OCSP server takes effort, but less effort than explaining to the insurers/regulators/auditors that revocation doesn't actually work.
As for CT, the log could simply include an extra (issuer-signed) field which amounts to "I will auto-renew this certificate until $DATE" and omit all the additional certificates issued to that same public key and domain name between the log entry and $DATE. Of course the browser would need to understand this field in order to validate the CT log entry.
I'm not sure super-short expiration is really preferable; it makes the Web even more fragile than it already is. Frankly I think Web PKI is sort of a big mess at this point. Most of it only makes sense when viewed through the lens of "(a) governments will always control DNS for the the two-letter TLDs, (b) Google cannot get all governments to supplicate to Google, therefore (c) we must conjure up an extra layer of entities (the CAs) that can be bullied around by manipulation of browser engine code". This is basically the only reason why DANE (or a modernized revision of it) isn't used.