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Issue with TLS-ALPN-01 Validation Method

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Re: Issue with TLS-ALPN-01 Validation Method

#4
Wonder how many ACME deployments check for revocation, rather than just being on an infrequent cron job? What proportion of affected certificates will be automatically renewed with no effort?

Looking at a few docs, probably not many. In any case there isn't (?) an in-band way to tell the clients that the cert is going to be revoked before it is revoked, so there would be some disruption.

Re: Issue with TLS-ALPN-01 Validation Method

#5
post #4

Wonder how many ACME deployments check for revocation, rather than just being on an infrequent cron job? What proportion of affected certificates will be automatically renewed with no effort? Looking at a few docs, probably not many. In any case there isn't (?) an in-band way to tell the clients that the cert is going to be revoked before it is revoked, so there would be some disruption.

There's a plan to make this information available to clients in the future: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-aaron-acme-ari/

Re: Issue with TLS-ALPN-01 Validation Method

#6
post #4

Wonder how many ACME deployments check for revocation, rather than just being on an infrequent cron job? What proportion of affected certificates will be automatically renewed with no effort? Looking at a few docs, probably not many. In any case there isn't (?) an in-band way to tell the clients that the cert is going to be revoked before it is revoked, so there would be some disruption.

Yeah, further, I doubt many certificates were issued from an account key belonging to a email address that people monitor often, if not at all.

Re: Issue with TLS-ALPN-01 Validation Method

#10
post #4

Wonder how many ACME deployments check for revocation, rather than just being on an infrequent cron job? What proportion of affected certificates will be automatically renewed with no effort? Looking at a few docs, probably not many. In any case there isn't (?) an in-band way to tell the clients that the cert is going to be revoked before it is revoked, so there would be some disruption.

WebPKI certificate revocation doesn't work anyways. It fails in exactly the case where TLS is needed: MITM.

All certificate revocation-checking schemes "fail open" and proceed happily on their way if the MITM blocks their communications with the revocation lists.

If you somehow don't have to worry about MITM you don't need anything remotely close to the complexity of TLS.

Certificate revocation is mostly security theater.

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