The article omits what I always considered the best argument against utilitarianism. It's basically a cutting-off-the-branch-you're-sitting-on argument, and it's due to Bernard Williams. 1. Utilitarianism asks me to choose to save 10 strangers over my own kid, as this would maximize human happiness. 2. The bond a parent shares with their kid is among the most foundational examples of human happiness. 3. If human happ…
Utility isn't the same as happiness. And in any event, another significant problem is in quantifying happiness, even if you were to base your decision making on it: how do you know that the decision-maker deciding to sacrifice their own kid would maximize overall happiness? How do you know those 10 strangers wouldn't be overcome with guilt, or that the pain of he decision maker wouldn't equal whatever suffering might…
In theory no, but in practice it is the concrete instantiation of utility most commonly proposed. Moreover, I think any definition of utility we invoke will be susceptible to a similar critique.
> another significant problem is in quantifying happiness
I agree with this, and I think the measurement problem is insurmountable. But I still think Williams' criticism is deeper. If we magically solved out the measurement problem (which, again, I think is impossible - the question is ill-posed) I would still be opposed to utilitarianism, because whatever notion of goodness we invoke becomes trivialised when we boil it down to a liquid currency.
> Sometimes I think these kinds of decision scenarios are fundamentally intractable, and don't really speak to reasons for adopting or not adopting any particular ethical paradigm.
I think they can be useful, but analytic philosophers have a bad tendency to lean far too heavily on them. Often results in missing the forest for the trees.